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I. INTRODUCTION**
Diplomacy has proven time and time again to, arguably, be the most
effective tool in dealing with some of the world’s most high-stakes,
international disputes.1 Despite its proven track record of success, there
has always been a sense, as it related to the protracted conflict between
Iran and the West—particularly the United States, that diplomacy might
give way to armed conflict, full-blown proxy wars, and/or covert
operations.2
On July 14, 2015, those long-standing fears were largely allayed
when Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”)
with the United States, China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and
Germany (the P5+1), which “cut off every single path” Iran had to a
nuclear weapon.3 Adopted by the United Nations Security Council
through Resolution 2231, the JCPOA addresses only Iran’s nuclear
program and serves as the guiding principle for the parties to adhere to in
the years to come.4 Despite President Donald Trump’s May 8, 2018,
cancellation of American commitments to the deal, the JCPOA not only
remains an active reminder of what President Barack Obama considers to
be his most significant foreign policy achievement, but also serves as a
testament to the determination both sides of the deal exhibited in making
sure opposing political and social ideologies do not extinguish this
delicate diplomatic flame.5
** Due to

the tremendous timeliness regarding the subject matter of this Note, the facts, figures
and findings are true and effective as of May 13, 2018.
1
Stephen M. Walt, Which Works Best: Force or Diplomacy?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 1 ,
2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/21/which-works-best-force-or-diplomacy/.
2
Obama: ‘All Options Are On The Table’ With Iran, CBS D.C. (Mar. 20, 2013, 3:29
PM) http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/03/20/obama-all-options-are-on-the-table-with-ira
n/.
3
David Blair & Ruth Sherlock, Barack Obama: US Diplomacy has ‘Cut Off’ Iran’s
‘Path to a Nuclear Bomb’, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wo
rldnews/barackobama/12104633/Barack-Obama-Iran-cannot-get-their-hands-on-a-nucle
ar-bomb.html.
4
S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015); Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ (last visited May 10, 2018).
5
Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-
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The concerted effort of all involved parties should now be the
preservation and expansion of mutually-assured adherence to the
agreement, as well as an avoidance of any policies or practices that inhibit
the JCPOA’s objectives during Donald Trump’s unconventional and
unpredictable presidency. Having conducted the laborious task of
negotiating and reaching this landmark deal, the diplomats reached “the
most critical stage” of “fostering an atmosphere of mutual respect and
understanding whereby the negotiating parties can move forward in
assuring the JCPOA’s comprehensive implementation.”6
The JCPOA was created to “produce the comprehensive lifting of
all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national
sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program[].”7 That is, “the JCPOA did
not resolve, nor was it intended to resolve concerns outside of the nuclear
arena”—namely human rights concerns, Iran’s support for resistance
groups, or Iran’s influence in other countries within the Middle East.8
Because the JCPOA is related solely to Iran’s nuclear activities, the deal
has only “produce[ed] the comprehensive lifting of all United Nations
Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions
related to Iran’s nuclear program[.]”9 Thus, prior to May 8, 2018, while
President Trump could have still imposed sanctions on Iran for what he
deemed to be other “malign activities” in non-nuclear areas;10 he could
not have reintroduced the lifted sanctions under the guise of other
justifications, such as ballistic missiles testing.11
While the JCPOA was signed by six nations, this Note will analyze
the impact and the relations of the United States and Iran in the post-deal
era. This Note is comprised of four main Parts: Part I outlines the history
of United States-Iran relations from the time of the Pahlavi Dynasty

deal.html; On Borrowed Time, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2016), http://www.economist.com/new
s/middle-east-and-africa/21710278-outgoing-american-presidents-biggest-foreign-policyachievement-now-looks.
6
Omid Irani, A Win for Diplomacy and the World, IRAN REV. (Aug. 11, 2015),
http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/A-Win-for-Diplomacy-and-the-World.htm.
7
S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4, at 2.
8
Statement by Jack Lew, Treasury Sec’y, on The Anniversary of The Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (July 14, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/jl0516.aspx.
9
Id.
10
Karen DeYoung, U.S. Slaps New Sanctions on Iran, After Certifying its Compliance
with Nuclear Deal, WASH. POST (July 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/us-certifies-that-iran-is-meeting-terms-of-nuclear-deal/2017/07/17/58d0a3
62-6b4a-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.7004cb4b63a8.
11
Id.; Peter Baker, Trump Recertifies Iran Nuclear Deal, But Only Reluctantly, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/us/politics/trump-iran-nucleardeal-recertify.html?_r=0.
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through the 1979 Islamic Revolution, while simultaneously highlighting
events that helped foster, if not explicitly create, the animosity between
the two nations. Part II follows the origin and evolution of the Iranian
nuclear program beginning in the 1950s with American help, support, and
encouragement. Part III tracks the diplomatic efforts, progress, and
dealings that ultimately culminated in the signing of the JCPOA in
Vienna.12 This section will also examine post-JCPOA era, focusing on
Iran’s commitment and the impediments still faced by prospective
foreign investors resulting from internationally-perceived American footdragging on economic sanctions relief as well as the ramifications that
will befall various international parties after the United States’ about-face
vis-à-vis the nuclear deal. Lastly, Part IV will highlight the importance
of preserving the spirit, intent, and objectives of the nuclear deal as the
basis for further cooperation between Iran and the United States in areas
of mutual interests—namely stabilizing the Middle East.
This Note argues that, while both sides expected that the removal of
nuclear-related sanctions would serve as the baseline incentive for
continuing adherence to the JCPOA, the agreement runs a real risk of
collapsing due in large part to the concerns that international investors
and companies face when seeking to invest in Iran in light of the
reinstatement of American sanctions. Prior to America’s upending of the
deal, there was a sentiment that, in an effort to ensure the survival of the
JCPOA, both Iran and the United States would have to pull their
respective weight.
Iran would have continued its documented
compliance with the terms and obligations entered into at the negotiating
table. In exchange, the American government should have, either
through explicit guarantees or implicit assurances, fostered a sense of
understanding with wary international investors who feared that any
investment in Iran would lead to hefty penalties by the U.S. Treasury
Department. A prominent New York City sanctions lawyer highlighted
this point: “Many of the major European-based financial institutions have
recently been involved in enforcement proceedings because of problems
they’ve had with [American sanctions.]”13 Ultimately, according to
experts in the field, “banks want the maximum certainty” that they will
not be subject to American sanctions if they conduct business with Iran.14
12

Julian Borger, Iran Nuclear Deal Reached in Vienna, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/iran-nuclear-deal-expected-to-be-announce
d-in-vienna.
13
Ladene Nasseri et al., What Investors Need to Know About Entering Iran’s Stock
Market, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-17/
what-investors-need-to-know-about-entering-iran-s-stock-market.
14
Fabio Benedetti Valentini & Ladene Nasseri, Europe’s Banks Are Staying Out of Iran,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-03/europe-s-
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In the absence of certainty, it becomes easier to see why Iran would still
feel choked off by sanctions, resulting in the greater potentiality that Iran
will walk away from the JCPOA.
II. THE HISTORICAL TIES AND TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND IRAN
Once great allies, the United States and Iran have recently
experienced decades of non-bilateral communications. Such a reality is
due in some degree to America’s once long-standing influence and
control over Iran’s government and rulers prior to 1979. Nevertheless,
both sides have committed sizeable transgressions, which have
undoubtedly contributed to the war of words and ideas that have come to
define American-Iranian relations since 1979.
A. The Pahlavi Dynasty: An Instrument for the American Agenda
Long before toxic vitriol divided the Middle East and much of the
Anglophonic West, Iran was “one of America’s closest allies.”15 The
Pahlavi Dynasty, coming to power in 1925, served as a satisfactory,
secular partner for America’s ideological and foreign policy-oriented
agendas.16 This partnership explains why Iranian history, at the turn of
the twentieth century, was rife with American fingerprints: “The Pahlavi
state under the [S]hah came into existence with the influence and
assistance of external powers, and continued to be supported by the
United States in a bid to ensure the strategic interests of the capitalist
world.”17
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (“the Shah”), Iran’s secular king
who kept dissenting pockets of Iran in check—even exiling a prominent
cleric, Ruhollah Khomeini, who would later overthrow the Shah in
1979—was the perfect partner for America.18 With Iran’s dissidents
silenced, the United States proceeded with its de facto policy of
“intervention in the social and political development of Iran.” 19 The
Shah’s reliance on the United States grew on a yearly basis. 20 The
banks-haunted-by-u-s-fines-forgo-iran-deals-amid-boom.
15
DOUGLAS LITTLE, AMERICAN ORIENTALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE
EAST SINCE 1945 145 (2008).
16
The Pahlavi Dynasty, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic
/Pahlavi-dynasty (last visited May 10, 2018).
17
MARYAM PANAH, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND THE WORLD: GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION 21 (2007).
18
JOANNA DE GROOT, RELIGION, CULTURE AND POLITICS IN IRAN: FROM THE QAJARS TO
KHOMEINI 198 (2007).
19
PANAH, supra note 17, at 17.
20
See PANAH, supra note 17, at 20 (“Between 1953 and 1960 the United States granted
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reliance was beyond just financial handouts. The United States even
“became involved in the establishment and training” of Iran’s royal
“security apparatus”—particularly the SAVAK which “engaged in
espionage and counter-espionage and domestic repression.”21 Such
generous offerings were presumably tied to the Shah’s reciprocated
gestures of serving “the geopolitical interests of the West . . . including
the consistent support of the state of Israel, defen[se] of the U.S.
engagement in Vietnam and adoption of a security role in the Persian
Gulf.”22
Domestically, the Shah was perceived as selling out Iranians who
“believed the central direction for the shah’s policies originated in
Washington.”23 He was “unable to handle the mounting economic and
social problems.”24 There was “considerable debate” in Iran “on the
extent of capitalist development” and the impact it was having on the
working class.25 Not only did the living standards of less-skilled workers
fail to mirror the improvements in the standard of living of their working
class countrymen, “increasing inflation” and a “rise in housing prices put
considerable material pressure” on the backbone of Iran’s population.26
Such sentiment was certainly not eased by the rampant “perception that
the Pahlavi state and its chief supporter[,] the United States[,] were the
root cause of Iran’s problems.”27 The Shah was widely chided as having
become “America’s Shah.”28
The Shah eventually lost touch with reality, his people in Iran, and
“Iranian students [who] were studying abroad during the 1970s.”29 There
is no shortage of examples demonstrating the Shah’s “offensive and
insulting” attitude toward his people.30 He repeatedly exhibited
grandiose notions of eclipsing Western standards of living. 31 In his haste
to “catch up” and reach his goals, he tacitly blamed the people of Iran as

$567 million in economic and $450 million in military aid to Iran.”).
21
PANAH, supra note 17, at 20.
22
PANAH, supra note 17.
23
Richard Cottam, Goodbye America’s Shah, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 1, 2017), http://forei
gnpolicy.com/1979/03/16/goodbye-to-americas-shah/.
24
TAREQ Y. ISMAEL ET AL., GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE
EAST: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 171 (2nd ed. 2016).
25
PANAH, supra note 17, at 21-22.
26
PANAH, supra note 17, at 29-30.
27
PANAH, supra note 17, at 40.
28
Cottam, supra note 23.
29
PANAH, supra note 17, at 34.
30
Marvin Zonis, IRAN: A Theory of Revolution From Accounts of the Revolution, 35
WORLD POL. 586, 600 (1983).
31
Id.

IRANI

2018]

2018

THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION

407

being the biggest hindrance to achieving such a way of life.32 He claimed,
“[i]f our nation wished to remain in the circle of dynamic, progressive
and free nations of the world, it had no alternative but to completely alter
the archaic order of society . . . .”33 He made no attempt to assess or
understand his people’s visions and needs, and made little effort to
explain why his trumped theirs.34 A prevailing criticism was that “he
showed Iranians no compassion and no empathy.”35 The culmination of
a departure from traditional Iranian norms and the “feelings of betrayal
and frustration, were significant sources of the revolutionary energy that
culminated in the overthrow of the Shah.”36 A new man would soon
answer the people’s calls and take his place.
B. Iran’s Islamic Revolution: Governance and Departure from
American Influence
Conservative clerical forces led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
who later became Iran’s first Supreme Leader, helped establish the
system of governance, which Iran retains today, after they successfully
overthrew the American-backed monarchy and sent the Shah into
permanent exile.37 The Shah’s push toward modernization had soured
Iranians’ perception of the West to the point where “defense against
‘Westernization’ became a major political issue.”38 In a blatant departure
from his predecessor’s position, Khomeini publicly chastised America’s
once-expansive role in Iran and instead pushed for Iranian “selfsufficiency,” declaring: “If we succeed in finding our true selves . . . we
shall be able to . . . do and make anything.”39 In order to accomplish this,
however, the structure of the new government had to embody Khomeini’s
vision for his new country.
The current manifestations of Iranian governance can be traced to a
pair of 1979 referenda, which helped cement the creation of the Islamic
Republic. The first and most decisive vote, approved by ninety-eight
percent of all voters, asked simply, “Islamic Republic: yes or no.”40
Shortly thereafter, ninety-nine percent of voters approved the draft
32

PANAH, supra note 17, at 24.
Zonis, supra note 30.
34
Zonis, supra note 30.
35
Zonis, supra note 30.
36
Zonis, supra note 30, at 599.
37
The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbo
ok/geos/printir.html (last visited May 10, 2018).
38
PANAH, supra note 17, at 36.
39
EVALEILA PESARAN, IRAN’S STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE: REFORM AND
COUNTER-REFORM IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA 70 (2011).
40
YASMIN ALEM, DUALITY BY DESIGN: THE IRANIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 65 (2011).
33
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constitution, formally ushering in the Islamic Republic of Iran with its
government embodying a dual system of democratic and theocratic
facets—an “inherent contradiction” that Iran has been grappling with
since the Revolution.41 Such gargantuan support, though, is typical with
referenda held in the wake of popular revolutions, especially in Iran’s
case, where many Iranians treated the Ayatollah and his revolutionaries
as “saviors of the oppressed.”42
The complexity and innate incongruity of Iran’s governing political
structure cannot be understated or overlooked. At its core, Iran is a
theocratic system of government that is intertwined with democratic
elements.43 This intermeshing of two seemingly incoherent governing
styles is overseen by an “ultimate political authority vested in a learned
religious scholar referred to commonly as the Supreme Leader who,
according Iran’s constitution, is accountable only to the Assembly of
Experts—a popularly elected 86-member body of clerics.”44
Notwithstanding its perception as a religious dictatorship, democratic
traditions are present in Iran: Iran’s legislators and President are both
voted in by the citizenry on four-year terms, lawmakers robustly argue
issues of significance against various political and ideological parties, and
presidential candidates are even put through the gauntlet of publicly
televised debates that become so passionate they sometimes turn
“personal.”45 Summarily, there is no shortage of “jockey[ing] for power”
between those atop Iran’s governmental power structure.46
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has overseen the country’s
most pressing issues since he assumed the position in 1989.47
“Khamenei’s central position as Supreme Leader affords him the capacity
to broadly shape the overall direction of the Islamic Republic.”48 In fact,
41

S. WAHAR HASIB, THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION: AN EXERCISE IN CONTRADICTIONS 4
(2004).
42
Scott Peterson, Iran: 20 Years After Ayatollah Khomeini, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0605/p06s04-wome.ht
ml.
43
CIA, supra note 37; Max Fisher, How Do Iran’s Supreme Leader and President Split
Power? Here’s a Chart Explaining It, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/14/how-do-irans-supreme-leader-and-president-spli
t-power-heres-a-chart-explaining-it/.
44
CIA, supra note 37; Fisher, supra note 43.
45
Jason Rezaian, Iran’s Presidential Debate Gets Personal, WASH. POST (Nov. 19,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-presidential-debate-gets-p
ersonal/2013/06/07/e0584e32-cf9c-11e2-8573-3baeea6a2647_story.html.
46
Fisher, supra note 43.
47
Akbar Ganji, Who Is Ali Khamenei?, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 24, 32 (2013).
48
ALIREZA NADER, DAVID E. THALER, & S. R. BOHANDY, RAND, THE NEXT SUPREME
LEADER 2 (2011).
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“much of his strength rests on his presumed moral authority and his
skillful orchestration of informal networks, as well as recent shifts in the
international and domestic context.”49 The evolving level of “increased
international pressure on Iran has enabled Khamenei to bolster the
revolution’s sagging legitimacy and discredit any moves toward reform
as externally inspired.”50
With the political dynamics outlined, this Note will now discuss how
the Iranian nuclear program came about, and how it became a pressing
international concern.
III. IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: FROM INFANCY TO MATURATION
The genesis of the Iranian nuclear program occurred when the
United States and Iran were close allies.51 Around the mid- twentieth
century, America’s official governmental policies and scientific
capability introduced Iran to the path of nuclear energy and enrichment.52
Along that journey the United States and Iran had a major divergence,
and Iran’s American-made nuclear program became a contentious
symbol of the alliance that was.
A. “Atoms for Peace” Program
Iran’s nuclear program “is a creation of the United States.”53 Under
America’s Atoms for Peace program, the “United States . . . provided
research reactors and enriched uranium to countries such as Iran,” laying
the foundation for Iran’s nuclear program beginning in 1957. 54 The
United States assisted Iran in gaining an understanding of nuclear power
through the former’s exportation of heavily enriched uranium to the latter
“in the 1960s for use in a research reactor,55 located in Tehran,”56 which

49
JERROLD D. GREEN, FREDERIC WEHREY, & CHARLES WOLF, JR., RAND,
UNDERSTANDING Iran 7 (2009).
50
Id.
51
Greg Bruno, Iran’s Nuclear Program, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 15, 2017), htt
ps://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-nuclear-program.
52
Id.
53
Steve Inskeep, Born In The USA: How America Created Iran’s Nuclear Program,
NPR (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/18/440567960/bornin-the-u-s-a-how-america-created-irans-nuclear-program.
54
MATHEW FURHMANN, ATOMIC ASSISTANCE 2 (2012); Ariana Rowberry, Sixty Years of
“Atoms for Peace” and Iran’s Nuclear Program, BROOKINGS (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.b
rookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/12/18/sixty-years-of-atoms-for-peace-and-irans-nuclear-pr
ogram/.
55
“Research reactors are used for training purposes or to produce isotopes that have
medical applications.” FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 16.
56
FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 15.
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is still functional and in operation.57 For a period of over twenty years,
American administrations from President Eisenhower’s to Carter’s
forged nuclear cooperation agreements with Iran with the intent of
developing its nuclear energy industry.58 A declassified study shows that
the United States had an interest in becoming “a major source of the
equipment as well as the technology used” in Iran’s then-fledgling
nuclear program.59 Ironically, the atomic aid the United States so openly
provided ended up “contributing to Iran’s nuclear weapons program”
when all cooperation between the two countries ceased after Iran’s 1979
Revolution.60
B. The Origin and Evolution of the Iranian Sanctions Regime
Economic sanctions have long been a favorite tool of U.S. foreign
policy.61 From the end of World War II to 1990, the United States
imposed two-thirds of all global sanctions.62 As an additional
perspective, “[b]etween its formation in 1945 and [August 6, 1990], the
United Nations had imposed sanctions only twice in its history[, whereas]
the United States used sanctions about twice a year for a total of about
one hundred times. But since 2000, the implementation rate has risen
fifty percent to about three per year.”63 American policymakers have
been enticed by sanctions because they seem more substantial than “mere
diplomacy” and do not present the risks or costs of military intervention.64
However, if used wantonly, sanctions can inflict enormous harm to a
country with a small or vulnerable economy. A perfect example which
is Iran. Despite the fact that it has repeatedly been shown that
“sanctions . . . have failed to achieve any of their major goals,” the United
States led a significantly sweeping sanctions regime.65 Such outcomes
are typical and largely hurt ordinary citizens.66 In short, economic
57

Research purposes were, and in many respects still are, the reasoning Iran uses for
continuing its legal nuclear program. Inskeep, supra note 53.
58
FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 82-88.
59
FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60
FURHMANN, supra note 54, at 84.
61
Joy Gordon, ‘Smart Sanctions’ on Iran are Dumb, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Sept. 20,
2016), http://fpif.org/smart_sanctions_on_iran_are_dumb/.
62
Id.
63
P.R. KUMARASWAMY, CAUGHT IN CROSSFIRE: CIVILIANS IN CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 178-79 (2008).
64
Gordon, supra note 61.
65
HOSSEIN ALIKHANI, SANCTIONING IRAN: ANATOMY OF A FAILED POLICY 408 (2000).
66
Much like in Iraq during the 1990s, Iran today is largely dependent on oil exports for
revenue creation. Thus, any action preventing such transactions helped create a devastating
collateral effect on the ordinary Iranian population. Matt W. Dawson, How Economic
Sanctions Affect Poor People, FEDERALIST (Feb. 13, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2015/
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sanctions have tangible consequences for average Iranians.67
“The U.S. has a long history of sanctioning Iran . . . starting with
Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, and continuing through the ‘80s and
into today.68 American sanctions against Iran derive their prologue from
the International Emergency Powers Act of 1977 (“IEEPA”)69—a power
invoked for the first time by President Carter through Executive Order
1217070 in response to, and ten days after, the takeover of the American
embassy in Tehran.71 President Carter declared a national emergency on
November 14, 1979, and prevented the transfer or removal of “all
property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran
which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States . . . .”72
These economic sanctions, later expanded by President Reagan,
accompanied by retaliatory Iranian measures against American interests,
set the stage for decades of animus, generations of mistrust, and a bevy
of missed opportunities.73 Consequently, the diplomatic needle began to
shift away from an allegiance and toward an inevitable clash of two
powerful, prideful, and prominent countries.
The voluminous increase of American sanctions against Iran has
come into existence courtesy of numerous justifications.74
Rationalizations for such sweeping sanctions originated with the
American hostage crisis, later to be superseded by the desire to rebuke
Iran over its ties to resistance groups across the Middle East that the
United States deemed to be terrorists, then to human rights concerns

12/14/how-economic-sanctions-affect-poor-people/. See KUMARASWAMY, supra note 63, at
179; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Sanctions on Iran: ‘Ordinary People Are the Target’,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/10/sanctions-iran
-ordinary-people-target.
67
PBS News Hour, Economic Sanctions Have Tangible Consequences for Average
Iranians, PBS (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/economic-sanctions-have-t
angible-consequences-average-iranians/.
68
Matt Pearce, Where Are Iran’s Billions in Frozen Assets, and How Soon Will It Get
Them Back?, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-gf-ira
n-frozen-assets-20160120-story.html.
69
See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1708 (2016).
70
Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (Nov. 14, 1979).
71
Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2-13/09/1
5/world/meast/iran-hostage-crisis-fast-facts/index.html.
72
Id.; Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65729 (Nov. 14, 1979).
73
Exec. Order No. 12613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41940 (Oct. 29, 1987).
74
Patrick Clawson, U.S. Sanctions, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resou
rce/us-sanctions (last visited May 10, 2018) (“The United States has had sanctions on Iran for
most of the period since the 1979 Islamic revolution . . . .”).
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before culminating with the punishment of Iran’s legal nuclear program.75
To date, a majority of the American-imposed sanctions against Iran are
statutorily authorized under the IEEPA.76 True to form and keeping in
line with American precedent, President Trump has continued the IEEPA
national emergency designation against Iran.77 This authorizes the
President to utilize coercive economic power as a means to counter “any
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a
national emergency with respect to such threat.”78
As per the IEEPA, the President can assign sanctions enforcement
to the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (“OFAC”), a subdivision of U.S.
Department of the Treasury.79 The OFAC is tasked with overseeing and
enforcing America’s sanctions policy.80 One of OFAC’s duties is to
monitor the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list
(“SDN list”),81 by ensuring that private entities do not violate American
sanctions by conducting business with those on the SDN list.82
Two post-9/11 developments greatly enhanced the President’s
already powerful IEEPA powers. First, Executive Order 13224
essentially allowed any actor who “commit[s]” or “support[s] terrorism”
under the umbrella of IEEPA sanctions,83 thus bringing them under the
purview of the SDN list.84 Such a classification is important in that it

75
Zachary Laub, International Sanctions on Iran, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 22,
2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/international-sanctions-iran; William O. Beeman,
Does Iran Have the Right to Enrich Uranium? The Answer Is Yes, HUFFINGTON POST, http://w
ww.huffingtonpost.com/william-o-beeman/does-iran-have-the-right-_b_4181347.html (last
visited May 10, 2017).
76
See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1708 (2016).
77
Memoranda from Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, on Continuation of
the National Emergency with Respect to Iran (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/pr
esidential-actions/notice-regarding-continuation-national-emergency-respect-iran/.
78
50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61).
79
OFAC FAQs: General Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov
/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_general.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
80
Kian Arash Meshkat, The Burden of Economic Sanctions on Iranian-Americans, 44
GEO. J. INT’L L. 915, 927 (2013) (summarizing the history of American sanctions
authorization).
81
Barry E. Carter & Ryan Farha, Overview and Operation of U.S. Financial Sanctions,
Including the Example of Iran, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 903, 904-05 (2013) (outlining the
importance of OFAC’s role vis-à-vis the SDN list).
82
Meshkat, supra note 80, at 939.
83
See Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (2001).
84
See id.; Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN), U.S. DEP’T
OF TREASURY (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/
Pages/default.aspx.
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allows for the immediate blocking or freezing of any US-based assets
involved in business with such entities, and also lodge civil or criminal
charges for any business dealings that are in violation of such
proscriptions.85
The second development was the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (“PATRIOT Act”), a law passed in the shadow
of September 11, 2001.86 Among other things, the PATRIOT Act allows
entities who have been designated as “primary money laundering
concerns”87 to be penalized through “prohibiting the opening or
maintenance of any correspondent or payable-through accounts” among
U.S. financial institutions.88 The PATRIOT Act also permits the United
States to confiscate assets in the United States belonging to the
aforementioned entities if they are deemed to have violated any aspect of
the American sanctions regime.89 With these powers in its arsenal, the
United States was well-equipped with a bevy of economic armaments it
could use against Iran.
OFAC’s aim at the international banking system “deepen[ed] Iran’s
financial isolation” by restricting its access to the global financial
system.90 Using the threat of sanctions, the United States gave a
ultimatum to other nations: conduct business with Iran or the United
States.91 Given that the United States is the “largest national economy on
Earth . . . most countries chose the United States.”92 Further “tightening
the economic noose,”93 the United States employed secondary sanctions94
SUZANNE MALONEY, IRAN’S POLITICAL ECONOMY SINCE THE REVOLUTION 459 (2015)
(evaluating the significance of SDN labelling).
86
See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
311, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
87
See § 311.
88
See id.; Fact Sheet: Overview of Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY (Feb. 10, 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg10
56.aspx.
89
See § 319(a).
90
Treasury Designates Major Iranian State-Owned Bank, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jan.
23, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1397.aspx.
91
S.J.R. BILGRAMI, DYNAMICS OF SANCTIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS 149 (2004).
92
MATHEW KROENIG, A TIME TO ATTACK: THE LOOMING IRANIAN NUCLEAR THREAT 75
(2014).
93
Steve Hargreaves, Iran Sanctions Will Hit Its Economy, But Not Kill It, CNN MONEY
(Jan. 20, 2017, 12:33 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/24/news/international/Iransanctio
ns/.
94
Secondary sanctions are generally imposed on non-U.S. persons for conduct involving
Iran that occurs exclusively beyond U.S. jurisdiction and which does not involve U.S. persons,
thus secondary sanctions are seen as more stringent because of their extraterritorial reach.
85
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against Iran.95 This tactic was first utilized in the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act.96 These measures, combined with other sanctions, made
it nearly impossible for Iran to conduct business internationally.97
Europe, following the lead of the United States, also applied
financial pressure on Iran. As a response to American action, the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”),
which connects more than 10,000 financial institutions and corporations
in 210 countries, announced in 2012 that it would terminate access to over
two dozen Iranian banks.98 SWIFT’s announcement came just one day
after President Obama met with British Prime Minister David Cameron
in a show of unity.99 Just like that, almost instantly, two of the world’s
largest markets, the United States and Europe, were shut off to Iran.
The conglomeration of American-imposed and lobbied sanctions
financially isolated Iran from the rest of the world. One by one,
international monetary institutions were forced to sever business ties with
Iran, torpedoing its economy and the way of life for its eighty million
citizens.100 This set the stage for the showdown that endures, in many
ways, to this day.
C. The Cost of Sanctions
Proponents101 of sanctions often advocate for “smart” or “targeted”
sanctions—that is, sanctions that are “focused on specific individuals,
95
Reuters, Trump Administration Imposes New Sanctions, Warns More May Follow,
FOX BUS. (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/2017/02/03/u-s-announces-ne
w-iran-related-sanctions.html.
96
The “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act” was renamed the “Iran Sanctions Act” in 2006.
Sahand Moafery, Partially Unwinding Sanctions: The Problematic Construct of Sanctions
Relief in the JCPOA, HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L. SEC. J. (July 15, 2016, 11:09 PM), http://harvardns
j.org/2016/07/partially-unwinding-sanctions-the-problematic-construct-of-sanctions-relief-i
n-the-jcpoa/; Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–172, 110 Stat. 1541
(1996).
97
See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111–195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010); Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112–239, 126 Stat. 2018 (2012); Toni Johnson, How Sanctions Affect Iran’s
Economy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 22, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/iran/sanctions-affe
ct-irans-economy/p28329.
98
Rick Gladstone & Stephen Castle, Global Network Expels as Many as 30 of Iran’s
Banks in Move to Isolate Its Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/03/16/world/middleeast/crucial-communication-network-expelling-iranian-banks.htm
l?_r=0.
99
Id.
100
KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAN SANCTIONS 26 (2017).
101
McCain Paints Obama as Naive About Middle East, CNN (Mar. 20, 2017) http://www
.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/02/mccain.aipac/index.html?iref=nextin (reprinting a Feb. 11,
2010, statement made by Senator John McCain on the U.S. Senate floor regarding the Iran
Human Rights Sanctions Act).
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entities, sectors, and/or regions of a country” as a means to evade the
perception of collective punishment.102 Yet, even these variations create
humanitarian consequences that affect ordinary citizens.103 Almost
invariably, sanctions impact “the poorest and most vulnerable” segments
of a population.104 In fact, studies have shown that “nearly all unilateral
sanctions fail nearly all the time.”105 Moreover, the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (“CSIS”) released a report which detailed that
“engagement with countries whose behaviors is offensive has a better
record of accomplishment, with less damage to U.S. interests, than does
cutting off most economic and political contact through comprehensive
unilateral sanctions.”106
It has famously been said that the
implementation of Draconian economic sanctions is “like applying a
meat-cleaver where laser surgery would be more appropriate.”107
“Comprehensive unilateral economic sanctions are almost always
ineffective,” and largely fail to meaningfully deliver on their lofty
promises.108
Both the United States and Iran pay the price for the international
economic sanctions that have come to hamper their respective economies.
While the economic toll on the Iranian side is well documented, the
effects on the United States, as it relates to lost opportunities, are
understated, but equally stark. One could argue, as the National Iranian
American Council (“NIAC”) did, that “the United States is by far the
biggest loser of all sanctions enforcing nations.”109 “From 1995 to 2012,
the United States sacrificed between $134.7 and $175.3 billion in
potential export revenue to Iran” and an average of between roughly
51,000 and 66,500 “lost job opportunities each year” due to its dogged
enforcement of Iranian sanctions.110 These estimates reflect only the loss

102
Id.; TARGETED SANCTIONS: THE IMPACTS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATIONS
ACTION 13 (Thomas J. Biersteker et al. eds., 2016).
103
Id.
104
Gordon, supra note 61.
105
ALIKHANI, supra note 65, at 412 (citing JOSEPH J. COLLINS & GABRIELLE D. BOWDOIN,
BEYOND UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: BETTER ALTERNATIVES FOR U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 6 (1999)).
106
DOUGLAS JOHNSTON & SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, ALTERING U.S. SANCTIONS POLICY: FINAL
REPORT OF THE CSIS PROJECT ON UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 7 (1999).
107
DAVID S. WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCESS 177-78 (4th ed. 2009).
108
JOHNSTON & WEINTRAUB, supra note 106, at 11.
109
JONATHAN LESLIE, REZA MARASHI, & TRITA PARSI, NAT’L IRANIAN AM. COUNCIL,
LOSING BILLIONS: THE COST OF IRAN SANCTIONS TO THE U.S. ECONOMY 12 (2014),
http://www.niacouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Losing-Billions-The-Cost-of-IranSanctions.pdf.
110
Id. at 3.
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from export-based industries, and do not include the detrimental
economic effects of other Iran-targeted sanctions, such as, higher global
oil prices.111 Thus, as NIAC calculated it, the total cost to the U.S.
economy is likely “even higher” than that which is estimated.112
D. America’s Missed Opportunity
Iran’s religious leaders have consistently denied allegations they
ever wished to acquire a nuclear weapon, going so far as to issue a
religious edict (a fatwa) that such a weapon is forbidden by Islam.113 In
2003, in an effort to allay American and European fears, Iran even offered
to discuss the state of its nuclear program.114 Dubbed the “Grand
Bargain,” Iran’s proposal included full transparency on the matter and
withdrawal of support for Hamas and Hezbollah, in exchange for security
guarantees from the United States and a return to normalized diplomatic
relations.115
As an affirmation of their seriousness, Iran entered into a negotiated
arrangement with European parties, which yielded a “detailed suspension
agreement.”116 In an even more blatant signal of sincerity and a
“confidence building measure,” Iran voluntarily “continue[d] and
extend[ed] its suspension to include all enrichment related and
reprocessing activities.”117 However, all this was for naught when
President Bush decided to “rebuff this overture without any attempt at
verification or follow-up” because of perceived American insecurity
surrounding the authenticity of Iran’s proposal and concern over
“ambiguities surrounding the Iranian leadership’s endorsement of the

111

Id.
Id.
113
Gareth Porter, When the Ayatollah Said No to Nukes, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 16, 2014,
11:55 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/.
114
Suzanne Maloney, U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Missed Opportunities and Paths
Forward, 32:2 BROOKINGS 25, 30 (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/20
16/06/summer_iran_maloney.pdf.
115
Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Diplomacy at Its Worst, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/opinion/29kristof.html; Excerpt of Iran Secret Proposal
Draft Document with Ambassador Zarif’s Edits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2007), http://www.nyti
mes.com/packages/pdf/opinion/20070429_iran-memo-red.pdf (originally discussed and
posted with Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Iran’s Proposal for a ‘Grand Bargain’, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/opinion/29kristof.html).
116
Abbas Maleki, Iran’s Nuclear File: Recommendations for the Future, 139:1
DAEDALUS 105, 110 (2010), http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40544048.pdf.
117
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Commc’n Received from the Permanent Reps.
of Fr., Ger., Islamic Republic of Iran and the U.K. Concerning Agreement Signed in Paris on
15 Nov. 2004, at 1, IEAE Doc. INFCIRC/637 (Nov. 26, 2004). https://www.iaea.org/sites/def
ault/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf.
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proposal.”118 Thus, efforts to reach a deal on Iran’s nuclear program
collapsed when they were ripest.
Indeed, the nuclear issue plaguing Iran and the West has “been a
symptom, not a cause, of mistrust and conflict.”119
III. LET’S MAKE A DEAL
Recognizing the unsuitability of their intractable ways, the United
States and Iran both seized on the elections of their respective pragmatic
presidents, Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, in order to bring decades
of hostility to a close. Opting for a diplomatic engagement, the United
States and Iran demonstrated to the world and naysayers that diplomacy
was not an arcane vestige of the past, but an essential ingredient in
resolving the two sides’ most festering issues—American sanctions in
response to Iran’s nuclear program. Yet, despite all the fanfare
surrounding this historic achievement, the JCPOA’s most recent results
and implementation left, and continue to leave, a lot to be desired.
A. The History and Negotiations of the JCPOA
The re-election of President Obama in the United States and the
election of President Rouhani in Iran, in 2012 and 2013 respectively,
proved to be a harbinger of diplomacy that had often evaded AmericanIranian dialogue. President Obama won his 2008 campaign and his 2012
re-election bid running on a platform that was skeptical toward military
intervention and buttressed by his dream of a “world without nuclear
weapons.”120 Over 6,000 miles away in Tehran, the landslide election of
President Rouhani reinforced the notion that Iranians wanted to re-engage
diplomatically and reintegrate with the world and its economy. 121 Such
a convergence of seemingly irreconcilable positions helped prime the
atmosphere for the historic negotiations leading to the JCPOA.
Less than five months after President Rouhani’s inauguration, Iran
agreed to the Joint Plan of Action (“JPOA”)—a preliminary, non-binding

118

Maloney, supra note 114, at 30-31.
Mohammad Javad Zarif, Opinion, A Message from Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/20/opinion/mohammad-javad-zarif-a-message-from-iran.
html.
120
Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks at Hradcany Square in Prague
(Apr. 5, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-bar
ack-obama-prague-delivered.
121
Hamidreza Gholamzadeh, The Rouhani Metre: A Mix of Broken Promises and Hope,
AL JAZEERA (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/11/rouhani-me
tere-mix-broken-promises-hope-201311412256389452.html.
119
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agreement,122 which served as the precursor for the JCPOA.123 The JPOA
was an interim agreement, which called for a six-month freeze of
elements of Iran’s nuclear program, in exchange for narrow sanctions
relief.124 The logic behind such a negotiated arrangement was that, with
the modest success of the JPOA, both sides could work “in good faith”
toward reaching an enduring pact.125 After much hysteria and fanfare,
Iran and the P5+1 finalized the JCPOA on July 14, 2015.126 The United
Nations Security Council then unanimously approved the agreement in
Security Council Resolution 2231, affording the JCPOA the credence of
international law.127
In the aftermath of the deal, a pair of dissenting nations, Saudi
Arabia and Israel, insecure in their own regional standing and dealing
with unstable constituencies, decried the JCPOA as a “bad mistake of
epic proportions.”128 Yet, bloviating statements from such pockets were
ignored as the rest of the world ushered in this “important success,” which
would “make our world a safer place.”129 As for the two major parties
involved, the United States and Iran were very pleased at their diplomatic
triumph. President Obama and his Secretary of State John Kerry called
the JCPOA a good deal.130 Their Iranian counterparts, President
Rouhani131 and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, both called the
outcome a “win-win”.132
This historic deal verifiably bound Iran to its word that it will not
build uranium-enrichment facilities for a period of fifteen years.133
122

KENNETH KATZMAN & PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RES. SERV., IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
1 (2017).
123
See S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4.
124
S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4.
125
S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4.
126
See S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4.
127
See S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4.
128
Netanyahu Calls Iran Nuclear Agreement a ‘Bad Mistake of Historic Proportions’,
FOX NEWS (July 14, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/07/14/israeli-cabinet-minis
ter-says-nuclear-deal-gives-iran-license-to-kill.html.
129
Robin Millard, World Leaders Voice Relief at Iran Nuclear Deal, YAHOO (July 14,
2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/world-leaders-voice-relief-iran-nuclear-deal-14111325
1.html?ref=gs.
130
James Conca, Iranian Nuclear Deal a Win-Win-Win, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2015), http://ww
w.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/04/03/iranian-nuclear-deal-a-win-win-win/#1
e3eaad68ac8.
131
JCPOA Implementation Two-Way Street: Iran’s President, PRESS TV, (Aug. 17,
2016), http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/08/17/480496/Iran-Norway-Rouhani-Borge-Bre
nde-JCPOA.
132
Conca, supra note 130.
133
Eric Bradner, What’s in the Iran Nuclear Deal? 7 Key Points, CNN (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-main-points-of-agreement/.
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Additionally, a comprehensive inspection regime was established to
monitor and confirm that Iran was complying with its JCPOA
commitments.134 Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to, among
other terms, reduce its stockpile of uranium by ninety-eight percent,
drastically dismantle its inventory of centrifuges from 20,000 to roughly
6,000, and redesign a heavy-water facility to make production of
weapons-grade plutonium impossible.135 Iran even agreed to have the
number of International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”)136 inspectors
assigned to its nuclear program increase nearly three-fold from 50 to
between 130 and 150.137 In exchange for accepting these intrusive
measures, Iran enjoyed having its assets in foreign banks, estimated to be
about $100 billion, unfrozen, and also received a reprieve from American
enforcement of its nuclear-related secondary sanctions.138
Despite the varied international sentiments directed toward the
JCPOA, it is worthwhile to note that the policy of seeking normalized
engagement in an atmosphere of mistrust is littered with uncertainty and
the fear of inevitable failure. As Suzanne Maloney, an expert on Iran,
wrote, “the failure of talks can always be depicted as a predictable
outcome to an uncertain engagement with a long-time adversary.”139 It
is no wonder that the term “engagement” has become “one of the trickiest
terms in the policy lexicon.”140 Accordingly, it would be wise for each
remaining party to the deal to practice prudence and diligence in their
conduct toward each other in order to incentivize the continued adherence
to and preservation of the fragile JCPOA.
B. Iran’s Commitment to the JCPOA
Having been on the receiving end of years of antagonism, exclusion,
and derision, Iran’s economy found itself “newly connected to most of
134
Eyder Peralta, 6 Things You Should Know About the Iran Nuclear Deal, NPR (July
14, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/14/422920192/6-things-you-sh
ould-know-about-the-iran-nuclear-deal.
135
Id.
136
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the global nuclear watchdog of
the United Nations.
137
See S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4, at Annex I ¶ 67.3.
138
Brian Murphy, Iran Claims $100 Billion Now Freed in Major Step as Sanctions Roll
Back, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iran-claims-100billion-now-freed-in-major-step-as-sanctions-roll-back/2016/02/01/edfc23ca-c8e5-11e5-a7b
2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html; See S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 4, at Annex II.
139
Suzanne Maloney, The GOP Plan to Sabotage an Iran Nuclear Deal May Just Work,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 10, 2015, 12:12 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/gop-plan-sabotage-irannuclear-deal-may-just-work-312674.
140
Chester A. Crocker, Terms of Engagement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2009), http://nytime
s.com/2009/09/14/opinion/14crocker.html?_r=0.
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the world’s economy” in a manner it was not privy to before. 141 Entry
into globalism and inclusion was “ineluctably associated with both
economic and democratic liberalism.”142 While this Note does not make
such an argument, it nevertheless bears noting that case studies such as
in post-WWII Germany and Japan have exhibited such tendencies.143
Perhaps this trend might even continue in the form of Iran becoming a
full-fledged member of the community of nations and exhibiting a more
positive role in the post-JCPOA era.
In March 2018, the IAEA Director General confirmed Iran’s
continued commitment to the JCPOA when he declared that, “Iran is
implementing its nuclear-related commitments” under the JCPOA and
stressed that his organization had “had access to all locations that [it]
needed to visit.”144 The IAEA concluded Iran kept its pledges and found
no indications of any violations in its fidelity to the deal.145 America’s
European allies also agreed with these assessments.146 So has President
Trump’s own defense secretary, James Mattis.147 In April 2018, mere
weeks before America’s retreat from the deal, President Trump’s State
Department issued a report declaring that “Iran continued to fulfill its
nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA).”148 Such declarations by key players validate Iran’s
seriousness about meeting its responsibilities and raise questions about
why the United States would upend an effective mechanism overseeing
Iran’s enrichment capabilities.
The prevailing opinion of the Iranian people since the
implementation of the JCPOA has been positive and has been marked by
comradery, compliance, and cooperation.149 At no point was this more
141
Elizabeth MacBride, Seven Reasons Iran Could Become an Entrepreneurial
Powerhouse, FORBES (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethmacbride/2016/04
/30/seven-reasons-iran-is-likely-to-be-an-entrepreneurial-powerhouse/#60010eda6391.
142
DAVID HELD, THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER 274 (2d ed. 2003).
143
THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, ECONOMIST, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2015:
DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF ANXIETY 4 (2016), http://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-De
mocracy-Index-2015.pdf.
144
IAEA, Iran is Implementing Nuclear-related JCPOA Commitments, Director Amano
Tells IAEA Board, IAEA (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iran-is-imple
menting-nuclear-related-jcpoa-commitments-director-general-amano-tells-iaea-board;
Francois Murphy, Collapse of Iran Nuclear Deal Would Be ‘Great Loss’, IAEA Tells Trump,
REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear/collapse-of-iran-nu
clear-deal-would-be-great-loss-iaea-tells-trump-idUSKBN1GH1I9.
145
IAEA, supra note 144.
146
Peter Beinart, Trump May Already Be Violating the Iran Deal, THE ATLANTIC (Apr.
29, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/iran-deal/559235/.
147
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148
Id.
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evident than at the ballot box, where tens of millions of Iranians voted to
re-elect President Rouhani with an overwhelming margin and mandate.
President Rouhani’s re-election was “especially refreshing given the
recent rising populist trends in Europe and the U.S.,” because it “sent a
resounding message to the Trump administration.”150 Iran’s outlook was
clear: its citizens demonstrated their will and their want to be “committed
to the path of diplomacy and moderation.”151 Iran’s President entered his
second term embodying “a sign that the Iranian people clearly desire[d]
peaceful relations with the outside world . . . .”152 Encapsulating the
sentiment of both scholars and government officials who deal extensively
with Iran-related, Gary Sick, a long-time Iran expert at Columbia
University, said analysts are “beginning to talk about Iran as a normal
player in the Middle East,” which represents a departure from the global
pariah it was once viewed as.153 Such accounts certainly fit the narrative
coming out of Iran touting their well-documented sincerity to this
international agreement. In return for Iran’s verified initial compliance,
President Rouhani believed that “some parties [to the deal fell] short of
honoring some of their obligations.”154
C. Roadblocks to Continued Cooperation
The United States Congress, Republican members in particular,
adopted “largely unprecedented tactics of obstructionism and sabotage”
as it pertained to both the proposal and survival of the JCPOA.155 In the
months leading up to the deal, forty-seven Republican senators “issued
an ‘open letter’ addressed to the Iranian leadership that intended to
sabotage prospects for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran by
cultivating doubt about the credibility and reliability of the American
president.”156 Moreover, prior to the JCPOA’s finalization, Congress
150
Erin Cunningham, Iranian President Rouhani Wins Reelection by a Landslide, WASH.
POST (May 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/moderate-incumbent-rouhanileads-in-vote-count-for-iranian-presidency-preliminary-results-show/2017/05/20/e4c156bc39b0-11e7-a59b-26e0451a96fd_story.html?utm_term=.2618091d5be9.
151
Id.
152
Edith M. Lederer, AP Interview: Kofi Annan Says Trump Should Talk to Iran,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 24, 2017), https://apnews.com/65651beba1c24f0ea7d2c041ef3
b0ec3/AP-Interview:-Kofi-Annan-says-Trump-should-talk-to-Iran.
153
Barbara Slavin, Iran President to Avoid Obama in Brief Visit to U.N., VOICE OF
AMERICA (Sept. 25, 2016), http://blogs.voanews.com/us-opinion/2016/09/19/iran-president-t
o-avoid-obama-in-brief-visit-to-u-n/.
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JCPOA Implementation Two-Way Street: Iran’s President, supra note 131.
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Foreign Policy, VOX (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2015/3/9/8177815/republicans-f
oreign-policy-sabotage.
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passed legislation aimed at strengthening its obstructionist agenda by
reviewing any finalized deal.157 The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
of 2015 required President Obama to report to Congress any final deal in
the negotiations.158 Additionally, various procedural hurdles were
created for the President, making clear Congress’s purpose of not wanting
to be circumvented in this international deal.159 The Act also explicitly
stated that, irrespective of any potential nuclear deal, “United States
sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles
will remain in place . . . .”160 Ultimately the Act failed in its goal to derail
the deal, but that did not deter lawmakers from overtly engaging in
rhetoric aimed at “sabotaging” its implementation by vowing to “do
everything [they could] to stop it.”161 However, lawmakers were
successful in passing legislation requiring the President to notify
Congress every ninety days whether Iran remained in compliance with
the deal via a certification.162 Under American law, the President’s
failure to issue a certification paves the way for Congress to re-impose
sanctions on Iran, should they elect to do so.163 Such hostile sentiments
revealed the lack of good will and sincerity vis-à-vis executing and
implementing the JCPOA in earnest. It is these hostilities toward the deal
that have allowed unease and apprehension to permeate the initial sense
of achievement among the JCPOA’s negotiators and diplomats.
During the 2016 Presidential campaign, one of then-candidate
Donald Trump’s most choral mantras was “rip it up”—a reference to the
Iranian deal that President Trump vowed to renounce and renegotiate.164
157

See Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201
(2015).
158
See id.
159
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imposed by Congress.” Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 135(c)(1)(E)
(1954) (as amended).
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42 U.S.C.A. § 2160e (Westlaw through Pub.L. No. 115-61).
161
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for International and National Security Law (July 23, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/iran/bindingiran-deal/p36828; Press Release, Speaker Ryan’s Press Office, “We’ll Do Everything We Can
to Stop” a Bad Deal (July 14, 2015), http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/boehner-iran-well-do-everything-we-can-stop-bad-deal.
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TIMES (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/opinion/trump-iran-nuclear-dea
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However, despite President Trump’s hyperbolic condemnations and his
October 2017 decertification of the deal, it took him another several more
months to abandon the accord in full.165 Prior to decertifying the JCPOA,
President Trump affirmatively signed off on critical sanction waivers,
which allowed the arrangement to remain in place and even twice
certified Iran’s cooperation with the terms of the deal. 166 In January 2018,
President Trump issued a waiver of key sanctions for a period of four
months while declaring that this extension represented “the last chance”
for those European countries that are parties to the deal and key backers
of it to “fix the deal’s disastrous flaws” or face an American withdrawal
therefrom.167 In response, England, France, and Germany proposed
adopting new European Union sanctions against Iran in hopes of saving
the deal, but the Europeans failed to agree on any such sanctions amid
fears that punishing Tehran for its missile program and regional role
would not stop U.S. President Donald Trump from abandoning the
JCPOA.168 Such concerns, coupled with President Trump’s failure to
issue further required waivers on sanctions against Iran before the May
12, 2018, deadline threated the very existence of this multilateral
agreement.169
Secretary Mattis, publicly stated: “When America gives [its] word,
we have to live up to it.”170 The top Republican and Democrat on the
Foreign Affairs Committee both expressed their bipartisan support for
remaining in the deal, maintaining that America’s adherence to its word

165
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167
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ree-new-iran-sanctions-as-trump-deadline-nears-idUSKBN1HN26O.
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Iran Deal, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 26, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/12/splitting-fro
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serves to advance its national security interests. 171 Others argue that an
American withdrawal therefrom amounts to a “self-inflicted wound” and
“would be the height of stupidity.”172
Prior to his termination, Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, had
admitted that Iran was in “technical compliance” with the 2015 nuclear
agreement.173 Such a statement came less than two weeks before General
Mattis, while answering questions in a Senate hearing, said that “[if] we
can confirm that Iran is living by the agreement . . . then clearly we
should stay with it.”174 These echoes grew louder in March 2018 when a
bipartisan group of more than 100 national security veterans, including
fifty retired military officers and at least four former American
ambassadors to Israel, endorsed the JCPOA and proclaimed that
“President Trump should maintain the U.S. commitment to the Iran
nuclear deal” because America gains nothing by scrapping it.175
Removed from domestic political allegiances, even the IAEA
unequivocally warned President Trump that the collapse of the nuclear
deal would be a “great loss for nuclear verification and for
multilateralism” because the international nuclear watchdog organization
“now has the world’s most robust verification regime in place in Iran.”176
Israeli analysts were even publicly quoted as saying that “[t]here is no
definitive smoking gun that Iran lied since [signing the JCPOA].”177
Such a collection of high-ranking voices overtly advocating against
America’s withdrawal from the JCPOA underscores the gravity of the
situation now at hand.
In spite of this insistence, President Trump still rejected American
involvement in the deal because of a long-harbored and significant
171
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Stupidity’, CNN (Nov. 10, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/07/politics/susan-rice-axe-fil
es-iran-deal/index.html.
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New Strategy Against Tehran, CNBC (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/13/tru
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5, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41489550.
175
Rick Gladstone, U.S. Experts Say Why Trump Should Support Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES
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interest in decertifying and weakening the JCPOA.178 The President even
tasked a group of White House staffers with the assignment of actively
undermining the deal and finding a way out of it.179 With such revelations
coming to light, it is hard to imagine how this landmark agreement
survived for as long as it did under his watch. This attitude was supported
by RBC Capital Markets, a global investment bank providing expertise
in banking, finance, and capital markets to corporations, institutional
investors, asset managers, and governments around the world.180 Its
managing director and global head of commodity strategy expressed their
skepticism and pessimism in the JCPOA’s survival when she estimated
that, “[t]he prognosis for the Iranian nuclear deal in 2018 also looks fairly
bleak, and the persistent threat of a U.S. sanctions snapback could curtail
foreign investment in the Iranian energy sector . . . .”181 The Eurasia
Group, an international political risk research and consulting firm, only
gave the JCPOA only a meager fifty-five percent chance of surviving
President Trump’s first term in office.182 Such realities merely reinforce
the tenuous nature that surrounded this landmark negotiation after
President Trump took office. Mutual mistrust and frustration have now
further intensified the landscape leading resulted in both the United States
and Iran to accusing each other of violating the “spirit” of the deal before
the United States finally violated it officially by leaving it. 183
With patriotic rhetoric and international scrutiny at a fever pitch, the
stage was set for a heavyweight, diplomatic sales pitch by both the United
States and Iran at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General
Assembly. As expected, President Trump came out swinging hard at his
predecessor’s approach to foreign policy, the JCPOA and Iran. By
labelling Iran a “corrupt dictatorship” and a “rogue state whose chief
exports are violence, bloodshed, and chaos,” President Trump once again
reiterated his contempt for the JCPOA calling it “one of the worst and

178
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most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.”184
Iran is by no means an exemplary international state actor, yet “while Iran
indeed is engaging in some very worrisome pursuits, the [JCPOA] is
confined to the nuclear program. And so the terms of the deal dictated
that “[a]s long as Tehran is staying within those limits, Mr. Trump has no
reason not to certify compliance.”185
President Trump, guided by his inability to recognize the delicate
nature of diplomacy and the significance of the United Nations audience,
was harshly criticized for his speech by the Swedish Foreign Minister
who remarked that, “It was the wrong speech, at the wrong time, to the
wrong audience.”186 The following day, on the same stage, President
Rouhani made a diligent case for Iran’s commitment to the JCPOA and
counterpunched against his counterpart’s amateurish international
display. President Rouhani proclaimed to the collection of world leaders
that “Iran will not be the first country to violate the agreement” despite
the arrival of “rouge newcomers to the world of politics.”187 France’s
President, Emmanuel Macron, in a pointed rejection of President
Trump’s approach to the JCPOA made it clear that “to denounce [the
JCPOA] would be a grave error, because it is a good deal”188 and warned
that it would be a “big mistake” for the United States to withdraw from
its commitments.189 Interestingly, even Israel’s army chief of staff, Lt.
Gen. Gadi Eisenkot has hailed the JCPOA for its success in delaying the
“Iranian nuclear vision by 10 to 15 years.”190
By decertifying the JCPOA in October 2017, President Trump
essentially was attempting to absolve himself of any responsibility as to
the deal’s future, because he merely “punt[ed] the question of whether it

184
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should be torn up to Congress.”191 Under the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act, a President’s decision to “decertify” the Iran deal opens a
sixty-day window for Congress decide whether or not to reimpose
previously removed sanctions on Iran.192
Congress, naturally
dysfunctional and stagnant, did not act in the allotted sixty-days, creating
a situation where President Trump was “back to square one, with the deal
he promised to scrap still in place.”193
The prospect of President Trump leading the United States away
from the JCPOA skyrocketed when he dismissed Secretary of State
Tillerson and National Security Adviser McMaster, replacing them with
CIA Director Mike Pompeo and former U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations, John R. Bolton.194 Both men are Trump loyalists who have not
only denounced America’s involvement in the landmark nuclear
agreement,195 but have also publicly professed their antipathy toward Iran
by pushing for military strikes196 and calling for the American-led
overthrow of its government.197 JCPOA onlookers warily and correctly
noted that the hiring and promotion of these “Iran Hawks” 198 “spell[ed]
trouble for the nuclear deal”199 because it further called into question
America’s sincerity vis-à-vis its commitments to the deal and
underscored the creation of “one of the most hawkish national security
teams of any White House in recent history.”200
191

Zeeshan Aleem, Trump Punted the Iran Deal to Congress, Congress Just Punted It
Back, VOX (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/12/16767908
/trump-sanctions-iran-deal-congress.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Gladstone, supra note 175.
195
Gladstone, supra note 175.
196
Tracy Wilkinson & Brian Bennet, Pompeo May be Even More Hawkish on Iran than
Trump, a Bad Sign for the Iran Nuclear Deal, L.A. TIMES (Mar.16, 2018), http://www.latimes
.com/nation/la-fg-pompeo-iran-deal-20180316-story.html; John R. Bolton, Opinion, To Stop
Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/
opinion/to-stop-irans-bomb-bomb-iran.html.
197
Brendan Cole, What Does Mike Pompeo Think About Russia, Iran and North Korea?,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/mike-pompeo-new-secretary-statewhat-will-us-foreign-policy-look-842647; John Bolton Wants Regime Change in Iran, and So
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The JCPOA now stands at a crucial crossroads where the
international community is able to uniquely gauge and dictate its success
or failure. Iran has repeatedly protested the fact that the United States,
when still a party to the deal, had not fully lifted its banking sanctions,
which spooked international investors.201 Clyde and Co., a leading
commerce and trade law firm, estimated that “more than half of global
companies interested in doing business with Iran are holding back for fear
of running afoul of sanctions . . . .”202 Speeches from Mr. Khamenei,
such as the one marking the 2016 Persian New Year, stating that “[the
Americans] removed the sanctions in paper only,” further underscore this
existing frustration and dilemma.203
Frustration has been mounting over the looming threats still posed
by penalties from the U.S. Treasury Department that have made European
banks very anxious about providing credit for large-scale projects in
Iran.204 Such angst is not ill-founded; it enjoys factual backing. “Several
big banks, including HSBC and BNP Paribas were fined billions of
dollars for dealing with Iran . . . .”205 Harvard Business Review echoed
such a reality when they wrote that “financial institutions remain anxious
because of the $15 billion in fines banks have paid for sanctions
violations over the last five years and the difficulty of avoiding the U.S.
financial system for bank transactions related to Iran.” 206 Because
American regulations and sanctions are still in place, it remains virtually
impossible for businesses to transfer money to and from Iran—a
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quandary that has been enormously exasperating for many Iranians.207
Perhaps the most important aspect which must be addressed in order to
properly appreciate the gravity and sensitivity of the JCPOA’s unfulfilled
expectation is the lingering ambiguity surrounding the fate of European
companies who have already started or wish to start conducting business
with Iran.
Secretary Kerry underscored this fact during his tenure when he
acknowledged that “[u]nfortunately there seems to be some confusion
among some foreign banks and we want to try and clarify that.”208 Even
European lawmakers decry the fact that the “lack of clarity from the U.S.
is causing a lack of certainty for companies . . . .”209 Their incertitude
stems from the fact that OFAC “has made it very clear that no payments
linked to Iran may be processed through the U.S. financial system.” 210
This web of dos and don’ts for potential investors is further compounded
by the reality that American sanctions against Iran concerning nonnuclear-related matters remain in place. An executive director for The
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) echoed such a point when he
stated, “[r]egrettably, remaining U.S. sanctions and related uncertainty
have hindered the return of global banks to the Iranian market and
continue to hamper large-scale investment and trade.”211 Such measures
“effectively block any transactions with Iran . . . based on the U.S. dollar,
because they would ultimately have to be cleared in the US.”212
Caught in the middle of this economic strong-arming are innocent
Iranians who recently lost access to one of the most ubiquitous elements
in today’s globalized society, Apple’s App Store.213 “Under the
207
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8000f89c9dcafec/IMF-says-Iran-rebounds-after-nuclear-deal,-but-danger-looms.
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http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/07/17/475612/Iran-US-Ali-Akbar-Velayati-JCPOAsanctions.
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regulations governing U.S. sanctions, the App Store cannot host,
distribute, or do business with apps or developers connected to certain
U.S. embargoed countries,” namely Iran. Such measures unfairly target
the Iranian public and stifle their personal economic prosperity and
livelihood. An Iranian entrepreneur expressed his frustration that, “[n]o
one with an iPhone can download any of the popular apps any more.
Imagine if in the U.S. you wouldn’t be able to get Uber on your phone.”214
Because Congress maintains a plethora of robust sanctions against
Iran to use as both a barking and biting force against companies that wish
to do business with and in Iran, the JCPOA’s potential has been largely
neutered. For this principal reason, economic relief hasn’t flowed into
Iran as robustly as expected and likely will not now that the United States
has abdicated its involvement therewith.
On the JCPOA’s one-year anniversary, the U.S. Treasury Secretary
stated:
We are meeting our commitments under the deal, by lifting
nuclear-related sanctions as specified in the JCPOA and by
providing clear and timely guidance to government and
private sector partners about engagement with Iran that is
now permitted. And Iran has benefited economically under
the deal, significantly increasing its oil sales, opening more
than 300 new bank accounts with foreign banks, negotiating
billions of dollars of new lines of credit, and seeing new
planned215foreign direct investment increase by more than $3
billion.
This statement, while technically true, was misleading and
contributed to the lingering dichotomy between American and Iranian
viewpoints regarding post-JCPOA developments.
Moreover, the
statement set the tone for the misleading talking points vis-à-vis Iranian
sanctions relief that were later touted and exaggerated by the United
States in an effort to muzzle Iranian protests regarding the dearth of
foreign monetary influx.
It should not go unsaid that Iran has enjoyed significant economic
gains since the JCPOA’s implementation. Per the IMF, Iran’s real gross
domestic product has grown by 7.4 percent.216 “Iran’s oil exports have
tripled since late 2015,” which has “helped offset large and unexpected
production outages” elsewhere, lowering international gas prices at the
pump.217 In the ever-lucrative tourism sector, “more than 6 million
travelers visited Iran in the year ending March 2017, up fifty percent on
214
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the previous year and three times the number in 2009.”218 According to
the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a hawkish think tank,
which relentlessly advocates for anti-Iran polices, Iran’s inflation rate
plummeted to eight percent in 2016, down from eighty percent in 2013,
because of its ability to sell oil on the international market. 219 It is
forecasted that Iran’s economic growth “will stabilize around 4 to 4.5
percent annually or higher over the next five years’ with an overall
growth pace of about four to five percent in the 2017–18 fiscal year.”220
These statistics reflect the incremental nature of investments by foreign
firms in Iran such as those by French automobile manufacturer Renault,
which has agreed to increase its production in Iran, setting a goal of
producing 300,000 cars annually by 2022.221
Such analysis is not to suggest that Iran has not benefited at all since
the JCPOA’s implementation, quite the contrary. Rather, the argument
rests on the view that despite the many remaining barriers, these are the
fragments of relief from the JCPOA, which have found their way into
Iran. With that, the potential for the originally expected windfall of gains
would be even more substantial if the United States were to give clear
assurances to Iran-looking international business investors. Yet, “while
Iran has been successful in selling its oil, United States banking
restrictions that predate the nuclear dispute have obstructed increased
trade between Iran and its European business partners.”222 Assessing the
Iranian energy sector, SVB Energy International found that “dozens of
deals” aimed at developing and reintegrating “Iran’s energy and other
industrial sectors [have] stalled because of [the] remaining U.S.
sanctions . . . [because] banks and businesses that use the U.S. financial
system are afraid of violating sanctions on Iran for its support of terror
groups and human rights violations.”223 Evidently, these institutions
“view the risk of violating U.S. sanctions as too great.”224
Statements coming out of Iran regarding Iranian irritation with these
hindrances demonstrate how fragile the JCPOA’s survival truly is. Iran
218
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argued that President Trump violated the nuclear agreement by
pressuring companies not to engage in business with Iran. 225 According
to Foreign Minister Zarif, this was a “violation of not the spirit but of the
letter of the J.C.P.O.A. of the nuclear deal.”226 The head of Iran’s atomic
energy agency warned that the landmark nuclear deal could collapse
because of America’s foot-dragging on the pledge of sanctions relief.227
Thus, the question is: Why should Iran forgo its nuclear capabilities in
exchange for being put in virtually the same situation it was in before
signing the JCPOA? Iran’s former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
repeatedly touted Iran’s resilience in the face of sanctions when he was
in office proclaiming, “[s]anctions cannot stop the Iranian nation. The
Iranian nation is able to withstand the pressure of the United States and
its allies.”228 There is some truth to that argument. Despite the fact that
Iran has lived, and continues to live, under American and international
sanctions for nearly four decades, Iran has still found ways to successfully
launch its first indigenous satellite into orbit, send animals into space for
testing, and develop drones to protect and advance its geopolitical
interests.229 Iran is not desperate.
In one of the post-JCPOA’s most telling episodes, the U.S. Treasury
Department, under the Obama administration, delayed granting key
licenses to the world’s two aviation goliaths, Boeing and Airbus, for
nearly a year; these key licenses were required to greenlight Iran’s
purchase of 180 passenger aircraft from the duopoly. 230 Such
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intervention by the U.S. Treasury Department was vital for Boeing231 and
Airbus232 to lawfully sell Iran aircrafts as “Washington still demands that
even non-American manufacturers wishing to sell to Iran to obtain an
export license if their products include material made in the United
States.”233 All such deals are dependent on U.S. licenses because of the
heavy use of American parts in commercial airplanes.234 These
obstructive requirements forced Iran to wait until 2017 before it could
accept the first delivery of aircrafts, and even then Iran only received a
mere fraction of the aircrafts it purchased.235 Airbus, alone, has ninetyfive undelivered planes bound for Iran in its backlog.236 Iran’s
desperation to obtain modern aircrafts and aviation parts represents a
microcosm of underlying vexation surrounding American policies. A
history professor at the University of Illinois, Behrooz Ghamari, stated,
“Airplanes have real political and symbolic significance for the Iranian
government.”237 Whenever “ordinary people and politicians referred to
how immoral and cruel these sanctions are, they brought up the example
of the Iranian airlines and their aging commercial fleet.”238
Iran’s aviation sector has been decimated at the hands of American
sanctions. Due to the damaging effects of long-standing sanctions, Iran
was forced, and continues in large part to be forced, to rely on obsolete
aircraft dubbed “flying coffins,” which make air travel less safe for
civilians.239 It is no surprise that “Iran has one of the world’s worst air
safety records;” the Flight Safety Foundation found that since 1979,
“1,672 people have died in 92 aircraft-related accidents.”240 Addressing
this issue in the post-JCPOA era should not take place at such a delayed
231
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rate. OFAC has the authority to grant companies specific licenses, which
authorize particular transactions that might otherwise be banned by the
remaining sanctions regime.241 It must do so at a more practical and
prudent pace instead of revoking them. It is for this reason that Iranian
dissatisfaction is reaching a boiling point, leading to a meeting between
Foreign Minister Zarif and his international counterparts on the sidelines
of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly to discuss “some
differences” over the application of the nuclear deal, “the first ministeriallevel meeting between [the parties] since the deal went into effect.”242
A persuasive argument can be made, buttressed by uncontroverted
facts, that since President Trump’s took office he repeatedly violated the
explicit terms of the JCPOA.243 Contrary to popular belief, the deal does
not only require the United States to lift nuclear sanctions in exchange
for a cap on Iranian nuclear enrichment.244 Rather it is more complex and
reciprocal. The JCPOA required the United States not to inhibit Iran’s
reintegration into the global economy. Section 26 committed the U.S.
(and its allies) “to prevent interference with the realisation [sic] of the full
benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified” in the deal.245 Section
29 committed the U.S. and commits Europe to “refrain from any policy
specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation
[sic] of trade and economic relations with Iran.”246 Section 33 committed
them to “agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade,
technology, finance and energy.”247
The Trump administration likely violated these clauses numerous
times since assuming power. It has been reported that at a May 2017
NATO summit, “Trump tried to persuade European partners to stop
making trade and business deals with Iran.”248 Then, in July, Trump’s
director of legislative affairs boasted that at a G20 summit in Germany
that Trump had “underscored the need for nations . . . to stop doing
business with nations that sponsor terrorism, especially Iran.” 249 Both of
241
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these lobbying efforts appear to violate America’s pledge to “refrain from
any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the
normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran.”250
The Trump administration may have committed other violations as
well. Section 22 of the deal specifically obliged the United States,
subject to some restrictions, to “allow for the sale of commercial
passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran.”251 To do
business with Iran, any U.S. company—or even any foreign company
that gets more than ten percent of its components from U.S. companies—
must get a permit from OFAC.252 Under the Obama administration,
OFAC began issuing these permits, albeit slowly. 253 In November 2016,
for instance, OFAC allowed the sale of 106 planes by Airbus to Iran
Air.254 But since the Trump administration took over, requests
concerning permits to export planes to Iran had been piling up as OFAC
had not responded to aircraft sales licensing requests since the first of
such licenses were issued during the Obama administration.255 Erich
Ferrari, a lawyer in Washington who works on sanctions issues, said there
has “definitely been a shift. Certain transactions that we’ve seen licensed
in the past under the Obama administration are now being denied.”256
It is thus quite clear why Iran’s most senior figures and politicians,
despite their patience and adherence to the deal, were dropping not-sosubtle clues to the United States that sanctions relief was lacking and
jeopardizing the future of cooperation vis-à-vis the nuclear issue. Abbas
Araqchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, made it known that: “If our
interests are not met under the nuclear deal, there will be no reason for us
to continue.”257 Such statements should have served and should continue
to serve as a warning to all remaining parties that the JCPOA is not
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impervious to inaction.
After such a tumultuous history between the United States and Iran,
the slightest perception of a lack of goodwill by either party runs the risk
of fatally endangering what remains of the JCPOA. Not only has
President Trump failed spectacularly in reassuring the negotiating parties,
including Iran, that the JCPOA is here to stay, he has actively turned up
the rhetoric and implemented additional sanctions while at the same time
deserting the deal.258 President Trump, emboldened by a highly partisan
Congress, runs the risk of needlessly entering “confrontation without
conversation.”259 Unfortunately, the clock is ticking toward the collapse
of the international community’s last best hope to remedy an enduring
and vexing international problem, a problem that has far reaching
consequences. Each party would be wise to practice prudence and
commit themselves more seriously to quell any concerns or
misconceptions in order to save the framework of cooperation that
currently exists between Iran and the international community.
i. Trump Nukes the Iran Nuke Deal
On May 8, 2018, the world’s worst kept secret was finally made
official: The United States, under the direction of President Trump, would
unilaterally abandon and violate a successful multilateral international
nuclear agreement, endorsed by the UN Security Council, by defaulting
on its commitments to JCPOA.260 This announcement was accompanied
by the reality that the wide array of Iran-related sanctions, particularly
those aimed at Iran’s oil sector, that were lifted under the terms of the
deal would now snap back over the course of the next 180 days.261
America’s European allies, long-anticipating such a rash move,
expressed “regret and concern” over the decision, while President
Trump’s predecessor and the chief architect of this historic agreement,
President Obama, slammed the announcement as “misguided.”262 Sadly,
258
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such developments are not new or uncommon under the Trump
presidency. What is worrying in this particular circumstance, though, is
that “[t]here is no strategy” in Washington for what transpires next—an
alarming hallmark of President Trump’s modus operandi.263
The American decision to violate the JCPOA and reinstate sanctions
against Iran presents many known and yet known consequences that will
be felt by all parties involved. In particular, it will create tension among
America’s allies when seeking to confront Iran, collaterally punish
ordinary Iranians, hurt the American consumers and American economy
in addition to escalating already fraught regional tensions in the Middle
East.
At the outset, such a decision isolates the United States at a
particularly precarious moment in international politics when geopolitical
developments seem to be in unceasing flux.264 This latest decision could
cause a serious rupture with European allies already seething from the
Trump administration’s threatened steel tariffs and withdrawal from the
Paris climate agreement.265 Moreover, given that the European
signatories, along with Russia and China, plan to stick with the JCPOA,
President Trump’s dream of exacting maximum leverage, in the form of
punitive multilateral sanctions that were imposed under the Obama
administration, could be unattainable.266 Particularly telling is the fact
that Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union have made clear
they would view a reinstatement of American oil-related sanctions as a
violation of the nuclear agreement.267 France has condemned as
“unacceptable” the U.S. move to reimpose sanctions on companies
trading with Iran, arguing European companies should not have to pay
for an American decision.268 European officials have signaled they will
not pull out of the deal as their stated strategy is to seek to protect their
companies from any U.S. sanctions, using so-called blocking legislation
Democrats, and the World Reacted, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/20
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drawn up in the 1990s.269
Rather than punishing the Iranian government, President Trump’s
move to dispose of American involvement in the JCPOA and restore
sanctions against Iran will squeeze the average Iranian.270 For the
working class and low-income people, new sanctions and renewed
isolation will mean fewer jobs, less security and more poverty. 271 As a
result, the poor will be forced to change their priorities: the time and
energy they could dedicate to peaceful protests will be consumed by
struggling to provide bread.272 As for the middle class and people living
in large cities, renewed sanctions, buttressed by the threat of war, present
an existential threat to their meager livelihood.273 Such a reaction may
well make the middle class become more conservative and more
receptive to the Iranian government’s narrative.274 This pivot would stem
from the fear of an economic collapse and chaos that will cause them to
give up demands for equality and justice in order to protect their hardearned relative comfort.275 When it comes to the government itself, as
the Obama years proved, a choked-off economy and its accompanying
black markets allowed a group of powerful people to monopolize the
economy.276 Sanctions never forced the Iranian government to cut back
its security and military budgets.277 Instead, certain factions within power
merely directed wealth to the top or transferred it overseas, and deployed
all their political and military capital to protect it.278
The decision to nix American commitments to the deal will also
inevitably hurt U.S consumers.279 Crude oil prices hit three-and-a-halfyear highs after President Trump made his announcement concerning the
JCPOA.280 As U.S. sanctions come back into force, Iran’s oil production
will take a hit causing a spike in oil prices, which will further increase
retail gas prices, that are already expected to be at the highest summer
269
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levels in four years.281 This would occur just in time for the summer
driving season and the midterm elections.282 Experts have predicted that
“thousands of American jobs in various locations of the U.S. would be in
jeopardy”283 if the U.S. Treasury Department followed through with its
stated promise of revoking already-issued licenses that allowed U.S.
companies, particularly those in the aviation sector, to negotiate and
transact business deals with Iran.284 Any such revocation would cause
Boeing to miss out on $20 billion worth of contracts it has signed with
Iran.285 This development would represent a huge lost opportunity for
the Chicago-based company.286 It cannot be underscored enough that
“[t]he U.S. economy will face headwinds from prices that will come as a
natural result of this [decision].”287
Halfway around the world, the reality of a JCPOA without the
United States will inevitably lead to more instability in the Middle
East as the geopolitical tensions there will only become more
pronounced.288 Within forty-eight hours of Trump’s announcement
that he was pulling the U.S. out of the deal, Iran and Israel came closer
than ever before to a direct military confrontation. 289 The Israelis are
increasingly worried about Iran’s establishment of a permanent military
presence in Syria and have begun taking things into their own hands with
airstrikes.290 Iran’s actions in Syria are first and foremost about
preserving the Syrian government as part of the “axis of resistance”—a
longstanding alliance between Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah, among
281

Justin Worland, How Pulling Out of the Iran Nuclear Deal Could Hurt the U.S.
Economy, TIME (May 9, 2018), http://time.com/5269906/iran-nuclear-deal-donald-trump-oil
/?xid=time_socialflow_twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_camp
aign=time.
282
Bremmer, supra note 264.
283
Jennifer Epstein & Justin Sink, What’s Next: Who Gets Hit When U.S. Resumes Iran
Sanctions, BLOOMBERG (May 8, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0508/what-s-next-who-gets-hit-when-the-u-s-resumes-iran-sanctions.
284
Lawder, supra note 230.
285
Bob Bryan, Boeing and Airbus Will Miss Out on a Combined $39 Billion Payday
Because of Trump’s Iran Deal Decision, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2018, 11:39 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-iran-deal-boeing-airbus-contracts-sanctions-2018-5.
286
Johnson & Katz, supra note 236.
287
Worland, supra note 281.
288
Richard Nephew & Ilan Goldberg, Here’s What to Expect Now That Trump Has
Withdrawn From the Iran Nuclear Deal, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 9, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.
com/2018/05/09/heres-what-to-expect-now-that-trump-has-withdrawn-from-the-iran-nuclea
r-deal/.
289
Jonah Shepp, Trump’s Iran-Deal Exit Has Raised the Risk of War Even Faster Than
Expected, N.Y. MAG. (May 12, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/05/iran-dea
l-exit-raised-risk-of-war-even-faster-than-expected.html.
290
Nephew & Goldberg, supra note 288.

IRANI

440

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

others.291 Iran is also seeking to consolidate its hard-won position in the
power competition between the main stakeholders in the Syrian conflict:
Turkey, the United States, and the Syrian government, along with their
respective regional and international allies.292 Syria provides Iran with
vital strategic depth, allowing it to project power through the Levant, and
gives it a gateway to Hezbollah, enhancing Iranian deterrence of Israel.293
In light of its objectives and Israeli aggression against “Iranian
targets—both facilities and people,”294 Iran exhibited restraint by not
directly responding to Israel’s strikes in Syria.295 That all might have
potentially changed when, one day after the Trump administration’s
upending of the JCPOA, twenty missiles from Syria struck the Israelioccupied Golan Heights,296 which Israel quickly attributed to the Quds
Force, the overseas arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 297
This attack was provocative, assuming the Israeli military was right to
attribute it to Iran, as it marked the first direct attack by Iranian forces
in Syria on what Israel considers its own territory. 298 From Tehran’s
perspective, Israeli strikes against positions linked to Iran and its allies in
Syria, alongside belligerent U.S. and Saudi rhetoric, are aimed at
undermining Iran’s deterrent capability.299 Provoking a military standoff
with Israel is not an Iranian priority. 300 Nevertheless, the specter of war
between Israel and Iran is rising and President Trump has done nothing
to temper this volatile and unpredictable situation.301
Despite the United States’ unilateral actions, the JCPOA is “not
dead” yet.302 President Rouhani said that he will hold talks with the deal’s
other signatories in the coming weeks, before the sanctions kick back in,
291
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to determine whether the deal would continue to benefit Iran.303 Foreign
Minister Zarif said he would embark on a round of international
diplomacy to try and save the deal.304 This glimmer of optimism is
tempered with President Rouhani’s warning that Iran could now restart
enriching uranium “without any limitations” if its “national interests”
were not met and the deal could not be preserved at the conclusion of
further dialogue with the remaining signatories. 305 Without the
United States’ active support, the deal faltered over the past years. 306
Now, with the United States actively opposed, it will likely collapse,
and soon. 307 It might be nice for Americans to think that the United
States, a democracy, exhibits more integrity and demonstrates its
trustworthiness more than Iran, but, as it relates to commitment to the
JCPOA, this would be a fantasy. 308
With a population of about eighty-two million and substantial oil
reserves, Iran represents a largely untapped market with the potential
for tremendous growth, a rare economic opportunity for Western
companies who wish to further their global reach. 309 It is no surprise
that exports from the European Union to Iran increased by about onethird in 2017 to about $13 billion.310 However, in light of President
Trump’s decision, many economic goliaths consider Iran as “not an
environment in which other big companies will see any reason to
commit capital.” 311 German Chancellor Angela Merkel said President
Trump’s decision to renege on the deal was a serious blow because it
would be difficult to keep the deal alive, given that a “huge economic
power has left.”312 In light of this reality and the fact that it remains
unclear if the deal can be preserved in the longer term without
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American support, U.S. sanctions could force European companies to
choose between retaining access to the American market or the Iranian
one.313 Most, if not all, will turn away from Iran instead of risking painful
U.S. penalties, meaning that Iran will see diminishing economic returns,
thus frustrating the main reason it signed the accord in the first place.314
If this is indeed the case, the international community can be confident
that Iran will not sit on its hands in the face of a major U.S. provocation
and unfulfilled economic promises.315 It is at this exact juncture that
President Rouhani’s warning of Iran resuming its “enrichment without
any limitations” could become a reality.316
Two key sanctions deadlines are important in gauging the
longevity of the JCPOA. The first such deadline is August 6, 2018,
by which time companies must wind down holdings of Iranian
sovereign debt or Iranian currency. 317 Any person or entity that
assists the Iranian government with acquiring or purchasing U.S.
dollar banknotes will be subject to American sanctions by that date. 318
Additionally, August 6 is critical because that is when sanctions are
set to snap back into effect, hindering Iran’s trade in gold and other
precious metals, graphite and coal, metals such as aluminum and
steel, the country’s automobile sector and luxury exports such as
Iranian-origin carpets and caviar. 319
The second crucial date to be mindful of is November 4, 2018. 320
On this date, sanctions targeting companies conducting business with
Iran’s oil industry are reinstated, including penalties against foreign
financial institutions that conduct significant transactions with
the Central Bank of Iran.321 On top of that, the U.S. will impose sanctions
on Iran’s energy sector and on petroleum-related transactions with certain
designated firms.322
What is likely to unfold is a relative period, perhaps several weeks,
of calm while the remaining signatories try to salvage the deal by
negotiating some marginal enhancements.323 They might succeed if they
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can assuage Iranian pride.324 Then again, they might not.325 If this is not
resolved before the wave of sanctions roll in, Iran will reserve the coveted
“moral high ground”—ceded by President Trump—to resume its nuclear
program, should they so choose.326 The reality is that with the return of
sanctions, Iran now has a strong incentive to resume its atomic-weapons
activities.327 Thus, the potential nuclear crisis that may soon unfold will
not be Iran’s fault, but rather that of the Trump administration and those
who prodded it to abort the one mechanism in the past thirty-five years
that has reliably and verifiably constrained Iran’s nuclear program.328
If Iran decides the JCPOA is in fact dead, it could kick out IAEA
inspectors and begin enriching uranium without any of the deal’s
safeguards in place. 329 In light of this, a rational thinker would
understand the premise that if you are worried that Iran is determined to
get a nuclear weapon, it is better to have the inspectors in the country and
on the sites as opposed to not.330 Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran can
enrich limited quantitates of uranium up to 3.67%, well below the ninety
percent weapons grade uranium needed to build a bomb.331 Those limits
are still verifiable so long as Iran exhibits what would now be optional,
unparalleled and unilateral good faith by adhering to the JCPOA’s
monitoring mechanisms in the face of American absence. President
Trump has repeatedly proclaimed that he considered having “no deal” to
be a better alternative than having “this deal”—the world will soon judge
whether or not he was right.332 Either way, the United States is far weaker
as a result of President Trump’s decision to sabotage the JCPOA, not only
because it broke its commitment to implement the deal in good faith, but
also because it imperiled the possibility of attaining diplomatic
settlements by undermining its credibility in diplomacy. 333
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IV. AMERICA’S INTERESTS
Despite their heated rhetoric and opposing worldviews, the United
States and Iran share significant mutual interests. With the Middle East
in such disorder, having the ability for these two countries to see eye-toeye is a potential that should be embraced and utilized instead of
dismissed and overlooked. While it would be naïve to say the JCPOA
realigned the United States and Iran on major international issues, that
same naïveté applies to those who refute the notion that areas of mutual
interests exist between the two countries. Moreover, independent of any
shared interests with Iran, the United States should have had a great
interest in seeing the JCPOA succeed in order to employ it as a
negotiating tool to convince other countries, such as, North Korea to
denuclearize.
A. The Iranian Youth
The United States has a huge democratizing incentive in assuring
that ordinary Iranians benefit from the JCPOA. Iran’s young,
westernized population actually serves as an ironic foil to its eastern,
religious-dominated system of governance. It is well documented that
Iranian hard-liners face a large and formidable population of high-spirited
youth who are fatigued by decades of religious edicts and isolation at the
hands of their government.334 Over sixty percent of “Iran’s eighty million
people are younger than 30 years old,” which means they were not born
until after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that transformed their country.335
In fact, the “Iranian youth are among the most politically active in the 57
nations of the Islamic world.”336 Such activity came to a head with the
Green Movement in 2009 when Iranians poured into the streets to
challenge what they viewed as a rigged re-election of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in a mass protest, which shook Iran to its core.337 The
Green Movement and its push for “people power” and democratic change
was, in fact, the precursor to the Arab Spring, which swept across the
Middle East.338 Recently, Iran, once again, experienced a national
movement of unrest which saw tens of thousands of protestors rise up in
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what is likely the most severe internal crisis the country has faced this
decade.339 As in 2009, the Iranian youth, this time aggrieved by their
bleak economic prospects and double-digit unemployment rates, are
playing a vital role in putting the government on notice.340
Poignantly, the Iranian youth share a commonality with the United
States in that both have been very much opposed to Iran’s conservative
leadership—a fact demonstrated by the youth’s overt resistance to their
government’s traditionalist tendencies.341 The very fact that the Iranian
population is “young, well-educated and primed to benefit from the
country’s opening to the rest of the world” presents the United States with
an opportunity to connect with a mass of people from which it has long
been disconnected.342 The youth in Iran “so deeply long to incorporate
American and Western values and traditions into their everyday lives.”343
Many Iranians “enjoy aspects of Western culture, seen through illegal
satellite dishes or over internet connections that subvert government
censorship,” but feel trapped by their leaders.344 The most involved,
impressionable and westernized bloc, in Iran is its youth who are stuck in
limbo facing what seems to be an unceasing binary pull between East
versus West, Iran versus the United States, and theocracy versus
democracy. Iran’s Supreme Leader has even publicly proclaimed,
“[Iranians] don’t have any problem with the American people. What we
are dealing with here is the politicians.”345
Not surprisingly,
Washington’s position differentiating between Iran and Iranians is nearly
identical to that of Tehran’s distinction between America and Americans.
President Trump tweeted several times in early 2018 about Iran’s
“corrupt government” and his “respect” for “[t]he great Iranian
people.”346
339
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The United States has the “transformative power of markets” such
as “Hollywood, hip-hop, the Internet, democracy and free speech.”347
Iran has already embraced American influence through everything “from
nose jobs to Steve Jobs.”348 Moreover, nearly fifty million Iranians are
estimated to be using smartphones, equipped with social media and
various communication apps.349 If America’s goal is to reach the young
Iranian populous and garner Iranian support on other fronts such as
eradicating terrorism and assuring regional stability, engaging and
embracing the youth is “likely to work a lot better than ostracism, covert
action, and repeated threats of military force, which merely galvanize
Iranian nationalism and help justify continued repression by
hardliners.”350
These facts all favor America’s vision for Iran. The United States
should be mindful not to sabotage potential international investors
seeking to invest in Iran. Should the United States permit Iran to enjoy a
modest near-term boost in its economic morale, America’s long-term
democratization interests in the country would be greatly advanced.
B. Geopolitics: Terrorism and International Security Concerns
After peeling back the prevailing layers of distrust and rhetoric
between the United States and Iran, it becomes evident that at least one
significant overlap exists between their mutual interests—the need to
address and eliminate specific terrorism-related and national security
issues.351 Chief among these concerns are the growth and spread of
terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, buttressed by the threat of
their international “wanna-be” adherents who blindly follow these caustic
ideologies.352 “[B]rainwashed by petrodollar-financed demagogues,”
er.com/realDonaldTrump/status/948548807612084224; Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTru
mp), TWITTER (Jan. 1, 2018, 4:44 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonnaldTrump/status/947810
806430826496.
347
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these terrorists live to put American lives in their crosshairs on a daily
basis.353 The seemingly endless terror attacks, highlighted by the
tragedies in the United States, Paris, Brussels and the Middle East,
underscore the need for “global cooperation” aimed at eradicating
extremist terror groups and preventing them from gaining a greater
foothold.354
Iran’s Foreign Minister has publicly made known that “there are
multiple arenas where the interests of Iran and other major stakeholders
intersect.”355 Iran now, perhaps more than ever, holds several cards of
great value as it relates to activities in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. 356 As these
zones of conflict come into greater focus, Iran is a key player who can
help dictate the fate of the entire region as the whole Middle East is
seemingly on the teetering edge of complete collapse. It is patently naïve
to overlook the fact that:
“[t]he United States will have a hard time solving problems
in the Mideast without Tehran’s cooperation: in Lebanon,
where it backs the Shiite militant group Hezbollah; in Syria,
where it is propping up the government of President Bashar
al-Assad; in Iraq, where it supports the government of Prime
Minister Haider al-Abadi and trains powerful Shiite militias;
and in Yemen, where to some extent,
it is backing the Houthi
rebels against the government.”357
President Obama even acknowledged such a reality when he
proclaimed that, “it’s important for [Iran] to be part of that
conversation.”358 Such a viewpoint is not merely one of a former
President who is invested in seeing the JCPOA remain intact, it is also
echoed by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan because of the
recognition that “Iran is part of the solution” to many of the Middle East’s
most volatile conflicts.359
Ensuring the JCPOA’s survival has the potential to “serve as a
prelude to contextualizing the region’s most far-reaching complications
in a manner that is inviting and conducive for Iranian participation.”360
President Obama again recognized this geopolitical reality, saying “[t]he
353
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truth of the matter is that Iran will be and should be a regional power.”361
i. Yemen
Yemen, one of the Arab-world’s poorest countries, has been
devastated by a war between rebel forces and neighboring Saudi Arabia
that has caused unimaginable internal strife.362 Yemen is representative
of the larger context in which American and Iranian interests potentially
are aligned. Foreign Minister Zarif has indicated willingness to sit down
and discuss the country’s most pressing humanitarian issues with the
United States, saying, “Yemen would be a good place to start.”363 Iran
has “offered a reasonable and practical approach to address this painful
and unnecessary crisis,” and called “for an immediate cease-fire,
humanitarian assistance and facilitation of intra-Yemeni dialogue,
leading to the formation of an inclusive, broad-based national unity
government” in the hopes of ending a conflict that was needlessly started
and has been needlessly protracted.364
America’s image certainly is very much invested in Yemen and what
unfolds there. This is especially true in light of President Trump’s
unrelenting order of Yemini drone strikes and his approval of a botched
raid which resulted in the deaths of a Navy SEAL and an eight-year old
American girl.365 The United States, through its intelligence assistance
and arms sales to Saudi Arabia, amounting to $110 billion under
President Obama alone, is “complicit in this carnage.”366 This military
collaboration proved to be bipartisan when President Trump signed a
massive $100 billion-plus arms deal with the Saudis only months after
taking office.367
Children are being killed in airstrikes at a staggering rate; sixty
361
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percent of the 785 child casualties caused by airstrikes were attributed to
American-sold,368 Saudi-flown aircrafts.369 Surely the United States does
not want to again be in the news across the world as being an active
supporter in a war that has killed “more than 6,500 people, displaced
more than 2.5 million others and pushed one of the world’s poorest
countries from deprivation to devastation.”370 The people of Yemen are
facing dire circumstances as the humanitarian crisis in Yemen “looks like
the Apocalypse.”371 Their “suffering is largely a result of monstrous
misconduct by a Saudi-led coalition that is supported by the United
States . . . .”372 The opportunity to remedy this tragic situation is within
plain sight. The United States and Iran both have national interests as it
relates to the Yemini despair, so why not create a climate where further
cooperation can develop organically? Iran has offered its hand; the
United States should extend its as well. After all, “[t]here’s an American
imprint on every civilian life lost in Yemen.”373
ii. Iraq and Syria
Iraq and Syria both have all the hallmarks of a proxy battlefield, civil
strife, and sectarian antagonism.374 They are both in the midst of utter
destruction at the hands of terrorist organizations who will stop at nothing
to hunt and kill innocent civilians, including Americans. 375 These terror
groups, and the extent of their claimed land, have ebbed and flowed in
both countries in the face of vigorous battles—yet they have still
managed to linger, much to the chagrin of peace seekers.376
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Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who is no friend of Iran, has
advocated for “coordination” with Iran in Iraq due to its influence, reach,
and contiguous boundaries with the war-torn nation.377 He, like many
others, has begun to recognize the importance of Iran’s role in Iraq’s
stabilization by presenting the idea of Iran “provid[ing] some assets to
make sure Baghdad doesn’t fall.”378 The two most influential outside
players in Iraq, the Unites States and Iran, have the ability to jointly bring
stability to the war-ravaged country.379 If the situation in Iraq is not
tempered, it would serve, not only as an embarrassing reminder of failed
American intervention, but also as a breeding ground for terrorists across
the border in Syria who continue to seek the overthrow of its President,
Bashar al-Assad.
For policymakers seeking to invoke meaningful leadership change
in Syria, “the choice is stark: the devil you know, or a pack of rapacious
demons.”380 It is clear that, “[i]f Assad were to fall, the chief beneficiary
would be the very Islamist forces that the United States is bombing.”381
The Trump administration’s messages, as revealed by the President
himself, and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, have
been extremely incoherent as they relate to Syria and Assad’s governing
prospects moving forward.382
President Trump’s limited, but
strategically inconclusive April 2017 and 2018 missile strikes on Syrian
airbases and other facilities demonstrate how fraught the geopolitical
implications of this arena truly are and how such efforts may be nothing
more than an “exercise in futility.”383 Because of the looming uncertainty
(July 1, 2016, 6:53PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/07/01/isis-exporting-terr
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surrounding a potentially viable replacement for Assad, any deviation
from the status quo would amount to a random guess at best. Through a
very strategic domestic approach to the Syrian conflict, President Assad
has masterfully positioned himself to serve as the lesser of two evils in
the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences, while simultaneously
parlaying the rise of ISIS’s radicalism into portraying himself as a de
facto U.S. ally.384
Influential voices, such as Ryan C. Crocker, a former U.S.
ambassador to Syria and other Middle Eastern countries,385 and General
Sir David Richards,386 the United Kingdom’s former military chief, have
advocated for Assad to remain in power. Both American and Iranian
interests recognize an Assad-led Syria as the most favorable outcome of
the Syrian conflict.387 In fact, “for several years, the Israelis appeared to
prefer that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad survive in power, fearing
that any alternative would be far worse.”388 Despite the ongoing internal
conflict in Syria, Israel’s Defense Minister has already proclaimed that
“Assad has emerged victorious in the battle,” further underscoring the
importance of American and Iranian cooperation in the country. 389
The Iranian position is almost parallel to that of America’s regarding
the Syrian quandary.390 While neutralizing Sunni-based terrorism is not
an explicit national security priority for Iran as compared to its more vital
concentration of retaining regional influence, the net result ultimately
yields the same reality: an amalgamation of American and Iranian
interests. Through its overt and sizeable support for President Assad and
wholesale aid in the battle against Wahhabi terrorism, Iran has blatantly
advertised to the United States that their mutual positions on Sunni-based
2018), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/trump-mission-accomplished-syria-missile
-strike-article-1.3933563.
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terror movements—particularly ISIS and Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham
(formerly Jabhat al-Nusra)391—are not too far apart from one another.392
Due in large part to the aligned interests of the Americans, Iranians, and
Russians, as well as their varied contributions toward fighting extremists,
“ISIS has already sustained heavy losses in men and real estate in Iraq
and Syria.”393 With ISIS losing ground daily and just barely clinging on
to realty and relevance, the effects of American and Iranian cooperation
could not be more evident. Iran, much like the United States, has waged
an almost identical war against the very same terror groups that seek to
wreak havoc in Europe and America.394 President Obama reiterated this
when he acknowledged, “[W]e’re not going to solve the problems in
Syria unless there’s buy-in from the . . . Iranians . . . .”395
These two hotbeds of terror have raised shared concerns for the
leaders and citizens of the United States and Iran. If these nations can
shelve long-standing fear in favor of pragmatism, they could make
substantial gains in these volatile arenas. By understanding and
embracing the unique intermingling of American and Iranian interests,
policy-makers in the United States should work toward salvaging and
strengthening the JCPOA, rather than subverting and sullying it. They
must communicate to Iran-oriented investors that their existing financial
ventures will not be penalized under the existing web of American
sanctions, rather than leading foreign investors down a path of obscured
legal ramifications that do nothing but impede the survival of the JCPOA.
C. The Endangered Prospect of Denuclearization and
International Arms Control
Thousands of miles away from the Middle East, sits an isolated,
paranoid, attention-seeking regime that, despite its recent charm
offensive and sudden about-face, has seemingly been hell-bent on
amassing nuclear weapons in order to reach an “equilibrium” of military
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force with the United States.396 In North Korea, Kim Jong-un rules a
country that neglects the well-being of its own citizens, has virtually no
international allies and has declared its “final goal” to make “U.S. rulers
dare not talk about military option for [North Korea].”397 Since coming
to power in 2011, Kim Jong-un has tested more missiles than his father
and grandfather combined.398 Coupling this armed, insecure, and
dangerous dictator with an equally unpredictable and chauvinistic
President Trump, could spell disaster for the international community.
i. North Korea
President Trump and his comments have not only exacerbated the
rhetorical war of words with the unpredictable regime in Pyongyang, but
have also fanned the flames of nuclear war with its young and enigmatic
leader, Kim Jung-un. Despite President Trump’s insistence that “all
options are on the table” as it relates to a potential military strike on North
Korea, others believe such talking points are merely bluster. 399 While
serving in his capacity as President Trump’s chief strategist, Steve
Bannon, said in an interview, “Until somebody solves the part of the
equation that shows me that ten million people in Seoul don’t die in the
first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I don’t know what you’re
talking about, there’s no military solution.”400 This has led President
Trump and Kim Jong-un, among others, to conclude that the North
Korean problem can only be solved through unprecedented face-to-face
diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving the decades-old standoff
between the two nations.401 This once unimaginable meeting is slated to
unfold in Singapore on June 12, 2018, after Kim Jung-un extended a
396
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goodwill gesture to the United States by releasing three American
prisoners.402 And this is where the JCPOA comes into focus.
A special adviser to the South Korean President publicly said that
“if the US had spent even one fifth of the time and effort on the North
Korean issue compared with the Iranian case, then the North Korean
nuclear issue could have been resolved.”403 Such a sentiment only
underscores the strength and positivity the JCPOA and negotiations can
have on seemingly intractable issues. What the overall JCPOA
experience demonstrates is that the diplomatic success yielded therein
can be replicated, and potentially also upended, in other arenas as well,
namely North Korea.
The critical catch-22 for President Trump lies in his calculus of
America’s countervailing interests in Iran and North Korea. From his
perspective, the JCPOA was “an embarrassment to the United States.”404
Yet, a total withdrawal therefrom now begs the North Koreans to mull
over the prospect that after months or years of negotiations, any potential
arrangement would be an utter waste of time as the American side would
renege on its commitment at some point down the line, thus further
escalating the already heightened tensions between the two sides.405 The
message North Korea now can discern from America’s deviation from
the JCPOA is: ”why negotiate with the United States if this president or
the next one can just throw out any agreement?”406 Naturally, “[t]he
North Koreans will wonder about whether one can have credible
negotiations with the United States” and question whether Washington
would stand by and honor its international commitments if one were to
be reached.407 Iran’s Foreign Minister, mindful of the uncertainty
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surrounding the JCPOA’s survival, warned of this exact potential in April
2018 when he said that an American withdrawal from the JCPOA would
send a “very dangerous message” to those who wish to negotiate with the
United States because it would create the impression that at the end of the
day, the operating principle of the United States is ‘what’s mine is mine,
what’s yours is negotiable.’”408
For the United States, its commitment to the JCPOA was always
much larger than monitoring Iran’s nuclear program, it spoke to the very
notion of American credibility and reliability. Wendy R. Sherman, the
chief negotiator of the nuclear accord, warned that “if the president pulls
back on the Iran deal, given Iranian compliance” with its terms, “it will
make diplomacy on North Korea almost impossible because U.S.
credibility will be shot.”409 Any weakening or abrogation of America’s
obligations to the JCPOA hampers Washington’s ability to resolve other
pressing international issues.
That is, if deals with the United States cannot be relied upon,
President Trump will give Kim Jong-un and North Korea one more
justification to keep chasing its nuclear ambitions and preemptively
sabotage the prospects for any potential nuclear deal. And in light of the
recent American stance toward the JCPOA, observers on the world stage
are left asking themselves why North Koreans would believe that the
Americans, over the long haul, would honor a deal any president
strikes?410 Put simply, the collapse of the JCPOA would serve to
undermine the high-stakes talks between Washington and Pyongyang.411
President Trump’s unyielding criticism of, threats to, and
abandonment of the JCPOA do not create a conducive environment for
another potential diplomatic win vis-à-vis nuclear non-proliferation. As
the world has seen, the JCPOA has been instrumental in capping and
verifiably monitoring a once unchecked nuclear program that many
countries viewed as a threat to regional and international stability. In
order to parlay the JCPOA into a similar achievement with the North
Koreans, there must be certainty that any negotiated resolution, should it
get that far, between the United States and North Korea would be
honored. President Trump’s actions vis-à-vis his May 8 JCPOA
announcement proved to North Korea that American guarantees “can be
408
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reversed anytime.”412 Constant threats of terminating or withdrawing
from negotiated agreements do not elicit confidence for concessions from
other prospective parties. President Trump either does not fully
appreciate such a dynamic or is simply dismissive of it. In either case, the
United States should be very mindful about the language and course of
action it employs in the aftermath of its JCPOA retreat, because, in many
respects, the North Korean regime is leaps and bounds more threatening
than the exaggerated danger a denuclearized Iran poses to the world.
V. CONCLUSION
Far from being the Faustian bargain many cynics branded it as, the
JCPOA has yielded concrete, verifiable compliance as it relates to Iran’s
once-unregulated nuclear program. This precious opportunity is fleeting
by the day as both sides become more susceptible to the behavior,
rhetoric, and outlook that created the pre-JCPOA climate of distrust. The
world must not let inane chauvinism or indolent acceptance of the status
quo dictate the decisions of tomorrow. On July 20, 2015, audacious
diplomats united together to prove, once more, diplomacy was not
obsolete.413 All parties involved in the creation and culmination of the
JCPOA expended a considerable amount of political risk and capital in
order to make this deal a reality. And yet, one might wonder how this
deal will survive the many tumultuous days to come with naysayers
barreling down on either side. But maybe these detractors are the driving
force, for they raise the stakes. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
must survive for the simple reason that the cost of failure is just too great.
As the thirteenth-century Persian poet Rumi famously said:
“Patience is not sitting and waiting, it is foreseeing. It is looking at the
thorn and seeing the rose, looking at the night and seeing the day.”414 Let
us heed these ageless words and not be complacent simply because a deal
has been reached, but instead let us foresee the promise it personifies and
work to ensure its endurance.
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